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THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS: NEW YORK'S
NEW HIV/AIDS PARTNER NOTIFICATION
LAW AND WHY THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
MUST YIELD TO PUBLIC HEALTH
The information gatheringand surveillance activities of the...
Government have expanded to such an extent that they are
becoming a threatto several of every American's basic rights, the
rights of privacy, speech, assembly, association,and petition of
Government.
-Arthur Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University,
addressing the Senate Government Operations Committee.,
It was a lie... Everything. My whole life .... Sometimes I
just wish he were here-so I could kill him!... I want to wring
his goddamn neck. I want to yell at him: 'How could you do this
to us?' I want to tell him I'm scared....
-"Marlene," 35, mother, widow, HIV-positive, describing her

feelings toward her late husband, who infected her with
2
the disease before succumbing to it himself.

INTRODUCTION
In July of 1998, New York State enacted a new Title III to
Article 21 of the Public Health Law, dedicated exclusively to the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). 3 Taken together, the
assorted provisions of Title III amount to a bold new partner
notification scheme for New York, 4 complementing the State's
previous partner notification statutes, yet greatly advancing the
1 Prof Miller's remarks were included in the Committee's Report on Privacy
and the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 7 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6922, quoted in United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 576 (3d Cir. 1980).
2 Andrea Peyser, Widow: My Life Was a Lie, N.Y. PosT, Feb. 8,1993, at 5.
3 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2130-2139 (McKinney Supp. 1999). Title I
was approved July 7, 1998, and became effective on January 3, 1999. See Act of July
7, 1998, ch. 163, 1998 N.Y. Sess. Laws 584 (McKinney 1999).
4 See discussion infra Part IHI.
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degree of State involvement in the notification process. 5 Unlike
New York's prior partner notification laws, and unlike a
substantial majority of notification laws in place throughout the
nation,6 Title III imposes an affirmative duty on physicians to
report the names of their HIV-positive patients to the State
Department of Health. 7
Thereafter, the Department will
undertake contact tracing and notify the sexual and needle8
sharing partners of the reported infected individual.
New York is not the first state to implement a mandatory
names-reporting system of partner notification. A handful of
others have similar statutes in place.9 Perhaps no state in this
class, however, shares the volatile political climate of New York
generally, nor specifically with respect to government
involvement in AIDS/HIV prevention. 10 Since its application to
5 New York's statutes pertaining to HIV disclosure enacted prior to Title III did
not go so far as to impose affirmative duties on physicians, or anyone else, to report
those infected, or to inform sexual or needle-sharing partners. See N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (allowing doctors to warn
sexual partners of infected individuals that they may have been exposed to HIV, but
not requiring that they do so). Another Act does impose mandatory testing for
newborns and requires that results be disclosed, but that statute is limited in scope,
as it is confined to newborn children. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f
(McKinney Supp. 1999).
6 See supra note 5; discussion infra Part HI.
7 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999) ("Every
physician or other person authorized by law to order diagnostic tests or make a
medical diagnosis, or any laboratory performing such tests shall immediately [upon
determining that such person is infected with HIV or has an HIV-related illness]
report such case to the commissioner [of the Department of Health].").
8 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2133(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999) ("Every
municipal health commissioner or the department's district health officer, upon
determination that such reported case or, any other known case of HIV infection
merits contact tracing in order to protect the public health, shall personally or
through their qualified representatives notify the known contacts of the protected
individual.").
9 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5131(5)(b) (1992 & Supp. 1999); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.051(g)(2) (West Supp. 1999); discussion infra Part IV(c).
10 Sponsors of the new partner notification bill in New York were barraged with
letters and memoranda in opposition to the law by a diverse assortment of lobbyists
aid interest groups. See, e.g., Position Paper on A. 6629/S. 4422 and A. 8861/S. 6051
from the Asian & Pacific Islander Coalition on HIV/AIDS Inc. 1-2 (undated) (on file
with author) (urging that Title I be rejected and resources diverted to pre-existing
voluntary partner notification measures); Memorandum in Opposition to Mandatory
Partner Notification from the Empire State Pride Agenda 1 (Mar. 1998) (on file with
author) (stating that the Pride Agenda is "strongly opposed" to Title I); Letter
from P. Wayne Mahlke, President, Lesbian & Gay Democratic Club of Queens, to
Hon. Nettie Mayersohn, New York State Assembly (June 2, 1998) (on file with
author) (urging Assemblywoman Mayersohn to withdraw the partner notification
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HIV, partner notification has met with fierce opposition by a
vocal, extremely organized lobby of AIDS-positive persons, as
well as an overwhelming cadre of gay and lesbian advocacy
groups. 1 Such groups are extremely active in New York, and
many vehemently opposed the passage of Title 111.12 Because
Title III contemplates mandatory partner notification rather
than voluntary notification, many opponents have branded the
law as too intrusive upon the privacy of those infected with
AIDS/HIV, describing it as inexcusably "coercive." 13
bill); Memorandum in Opposition to A. 6629-A/S. 4422-A from the Social Concerns
Commission and the AIDS Ministry of the Episcopal Diocese of New York (undated)
(on file with author) (urging that Title I be defeated). Other organizations opposed
to the law include the American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project, New York Civil Liberties Union, ACT UP New York, Harlem Congregation
for Community Improvement (HCCI), HIV Law Project, and Catholic Charities
Community & Residential Services. See Media Release from Stephen Soba et al. 3-4
(Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with author).
11 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, (Hon.) & James G. Hedge, Jr., The "NamesDebate":
The Casefor NationalHIVReporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 696
(1998) [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate] (discussing the early
implementation of names reporting and the almost immediate opposition that
ensued).
12 See supra note 10. The bone of contention for many opponents is the
mandatory, rather than voluntary nature of Title II's provisions, and the possible
effect of deterring persons from voluntarily seeking HIV testing. For example, Amy
Herman, the Executive Director of the New York AIDS Coalition, has declared that
"[tihe New York AIDS Coalition and its members do not oppose partner notification;
it opposes mandatory partner notification. There is a significant difference between
the two." Amy Herman, Keep H1V PartnerNotification Voluntary, DAILY GAZET=E,
May 5, 1998, (Letters to the Editor) at 33A.; see also Letter from the Council of
AIDS Program Directors and the Council of HIV Ambulatory Care Clinical
Directors, The New York Academy of Medicine, to Hon. Richard N. Gottfried,
Chairman, New York State Assembly Committee on Health 2 (May 8, 1998) (on file
with author) (stating that mandatory notification may deter people from seeking
testing); Memorandum of Opposition to A. 6629/S. 4422 (Mayersohn/Velella) from
the Gay Men's Health Crisis 1 (undated) (on file with author) (urging better training
of health care providers under current voluntary notification program);
Memorandum in Opposition to Mandatory Reporting and Notification of HIV/AIDS
Status from the National Organization for Women, New York State (Mar. 23, 1998)
(on file with author) (stating that mandatory notification "Will ultimately deter
individuals from seeking diagnostic testing and health care"); The Social Concerns
Commission and the AIDS Ministry of the Episcopal Diocese of New York, supra
note 10, at 1 ('The Commission strongly supports voluntary notification...
[r]equiring mandatory notification, specifically one which reports names, creates an
enormously suspicious and hostile environment which will certainly work against
the goal of educating and treating those with HIV.).
13 See Herman, supra note 12, at 33A ("[L]awmakers wish to create a
mandatory one-time program-which is viewed by many as coercive.... ."); The
National Organization for Women, New York State, supra note 12 (characterizing
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Indeed, it seems apparent that mandatory HIV partner
notification represents a degree of intrusion into the personal
matters of infected individuals. Some critics have likened the

state imposing compulsory HIV testing and disclosure measures
to an Orwellian "Big Brother," posing serious threats to our
fundamental rights of privacy. 14 Striking justifications for such
a dramatic legislative initiative as Title III, however, are found
in the cold hard numbers measuring the dangers and
proliferation of this disease. In recent years, New York State
has come to have more AIDS cases than any other state in the
country, 15 and the disease threatens to permanently injure the
demographic composition of New York's population. 16 Faced
with dual crises of the abridgement of our liberties and medical
emergency, one instinctively undertakes a personal calculus,
weighing the State's purpose in enacting an aggressive partner
notification law and the individual's interest in preserving his

privacy with respect to his AIDS/HIV status. In a testament to
mandatory notification as "a flagrant violation of an individual's right to privacy");
Soba et al., supra note 10, at 1 ("The [mandatory notification] bill would create a
coercive, government-directed partner notification program for HIV."); see also
American Civ. Liberties Union, ACLU AIDS Project Report: HIV Partner
Notification, Why Coercion Won't Work, Mar. 1998 (visited Nov. 13, 1999)
<http'/www.aclu.org/issues/aids/hiv-partner.html> [hereinafterACLUAIDS
ProjectReport] ("[T]he ACLU adamantly opposes state-mandated coercive partner
notification, including plans that require individuals with HIV to provide the names
of their partners to public health authorities and/or require public heath authorities
to notify partners without the consent of the patient.").
14 See generally Kellie E. Lagitch, Note, Mandatory HIV Testing: An Orwellian
Proposition, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 103 (1998) (discussing the constitutional
implications of mandatory HIV testing).
15 See Miriam R. Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy
Implications of Viatical Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1024 n.54 (1998)
(providing numbers of reported AIDS cases through mid-1997 in all fifty states).
New York had 108,756 confirmed cases of AIDS through December 1996, the
highest of any of the states that had reported 5,000 or more AIDS cases. See NEW
YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, AIDS IN NEW YORK STATE: 1997 EDITION 59 (1997).
The state with the next highest number of confirmed AIDS cases was California,
with 98,157, and Florida came in third with 58, 911. See id. It seems that New
York's more stringent partner notification statute is a reflection of its extremely
high AIDS rates in comparison with the rest of the United States. See supra note
41.
16 See Chris Norwood, Mandated Life Versus Mandatory Death: New York's
Disgraceful Partner Notification Record, 20 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 161, 165-66
(1995) (explaining that Blacks and Latinos comprise a dramatically
disproportionate number of AIDS cases in New York and that unprecedented rates
of mothers dying from AIDS in New York City are leading to one of the largest mass
orphanings in history).
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the law's tendency to reflect natural human reasoning, the
applicable case law on privacy and AIDS/HIV contemplates just
such a solution to the problem. In the absence of a Supreme
Court decision on AIDS/HIV disclosure, the federal circuit and
district courts have applied a balancing test, weighing state and
individual interests against one another.17
This Note seeks to contribute to the discourse on AIDS/HIV
partner notification with a decidedly narrow focus: To
demonstrate why New York's Title III should survive a right of
privacy challenge, based on current federal precedent. If this
Note assists either the opponents of Title III in assessing their
options for a challenge to the law, or the proponents of Title III
in crafting a defense to a privacy challenge, then this somewhat
specific objective will have been satisfied. In short, this Note
takes the position that, within the framework of the dominant
balancing test used in federal courts to review issues of
AIDS/I-V disclosure, New York State's interest in enacting Title
III sufficiently outweighs the infected individual's privacy
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his status.
Whereas notification laws of such an aggressive nature
represent a troubling new incursion into our liberties, the choice
to implement such laws has been made necessary by the
relentless assault of an unforgiving killer. The choice is one that

17 See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining
that resolution of a claim would require weighing a plaintiffs privacy interest in
avoiding disclosure of his HIV status against the city's interest, which must be
substantial); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1515 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that
an inmate's "limited personal privacy interestl" must be balanced against the State
Department of Correction's decision to segregate HIV-positive inmates from the
other, unaffected inmates); P.F. v. Mendres, 21 F. Supp. 2d 476, 483 (D.N.J. 1998)
(stating that the court's task is to balance an individual's expectation of privacy
regarding his HIV status with the governmental interest in disclosing such

information) (citing Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 1178, 1182
(W.D. Pa. 1991)); Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D. Mass.
1993) (same); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Ohio 1991)
(stating that not all information is protected from disclosure, but information
relating to AIDS is fundamental enough to be protected, and finding that Doe's
privacy interest in non-disclosure was not outweighed by governmental interest);
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (noting that "[clourts have
defined the scope of privacy rights on a case-by-case method, balancing the
individual's right to confidentiality against the governmental interest in limited
disclosure," and stating such balance is not required when the prison medical
personnel "make no claim that any important public interest was served in their
discussion of plaintiffs positive test for the AIDS virus").
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necessarily burdens the conscience, yet it is, ultimately, the
election of the lesser of two evils.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background on the rise of
the AIDS dilemma and the development of partner notification.
Part II establishes a context in which to view New York's Title
III and mandatory names reporting by reviewing the norms in
partner notification laws nationwide. Part III provides a
detailed description of Title III and its numerous provisions.
Part IV examines the constitutional right of privacy, generally,
and as it pertains to the individual right to the avoidance of
disclosure of personal information, including the disclosure of
one's AIDS/HIV status. Finally, Part V applies the dominant
right of privacy balancing analysis to Title III and endeavors to
identify and weigh New York State's interest in enacting this
legislation and the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure.
I. AIDS, GENERALLY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTNER
NOTIFICATION

The term "AIDS" is an acronym for "acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome," a disease characterized by the
gradual decease of the body's immune system.' 8 It is generally
accepted that the disease is caused by the human
immunodeficiency virus, or HIV. 19 A person may live with HIV
for several years before developing the family of symptoms
identified with AIDS. 20 Although recent developments in
medicine have brought measured success in suppressing cases of
HIV treated early,21 those cases which do develop into AIDS
18 See JOSH POWELL, AIDS AND HIV-RELATED DISEASES: AN EDUCATIONAL

GUIDE FOR PROFESSIONALS AND THE PUBLIC 5 (1996).
19 See id.

20 See id. at 17. The actual latency period for HIV infection is hard to pin down.
The amount of time it takes for HIV-positive individuals to display symptoms of

AIDS has increased dramatically over the past twelve years. In 1986, it was

believed that HIV developed into full-blown AIDS in less than two years. By 1992,
the latency period had become as long as fileen years. See ROBERT S. ROOTBERNSTEIN, RETHINKING AIDS: THE TRAGIC COST OF PREMATURE CONSENSUS 55
(1993).
21 New combination drug treatments commonly referred to as "cocktails" have
been very successful in suppressing, but not killing HIV. In many cases, these
cocktails have helped prevent persons with HIV from becoming sick as a result of
their illness. See AIDS Treatments Cheaper Than Believed, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
1998, at A9, available in 1998 WL 22542950 (noting cocktails "have proved
powerfully effective"); FDA Approves AIDS Drug for Use Against Hepatitis B, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 17, 1998, at 7, available in 1998 WL 23516406 (noting Epivir can
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remain relatively untreatable, and the condition is almost
22
always fatal.
HIV transmission is possible only upon the presence of three
factors: "() a point of exit from the infected individual, (2) a
mechanism to transport the virus to another person, and (3) a
point of entry into a second body."3 HI is transmitted most
frequently through sexual contact, 24 while a large number of
25
cases also emerge from the shared use of hypodermic needles.
Although anal sex is particularly conducive to the spread of the
27
illness, 26 transmission may also occur via vaginal intercourse
or, to a lesser extent, oral sex.28 Generally, heterosexual
intercourse poses a greater risk of transmission to women than it
29
does to men.

Since its initial documentation in the late 1970s,30 the
number of AIDS cases worldwide and in the United States has
increased dramatically.31 By a recent estimate, there are 22.6
million cases, globally. 32 It is no wonder then that a number of

suppress the HIV virus and has been approved for usage against hepatitis B). But
see Richard A. Knox, Some PatientsControllingHIV After Stopping Drug Cocktail,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1999, at A8, available in 1999 WL 6045080 (stating that
when HIV-infected patients stop taking their "cocktails" the virus quickly returns to
pretreatment levels).
22 See John W. Ward et al., Current Trends in the Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS,
in THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 3, 6 (Merle A. Sande, M.D. & Paul A.
Volberding, M.D. eds., 5th ed. 1997).
2 POWELL, supra note 18, at 33.
24 See id. at 34; RICHARD D. MUMA ET AL., HIV MANUAL FOR HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS 8-10 (1994); Wayne R. Cohen, An Economic Analysis of the Issues
Surrounding AIDS in the Workplace: In the Long Run, the Path of Truth and
Reason Cannot Be Diverted, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (1992) (listing primary
means of HIV virus transmission); Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Developments,
Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 5 U.C.L.A.
WOMEN'S L.J. 473, 479 (1995) (discussing forms of HIV virus transmission and
dangers ofperinatal transmission).
25 See MUMA, supra note 24, at 10; POWELL, supra note 18, at 39; Cohen, supra
note 24, at 1206-07; Grizzi, supra note 24, at 479.
2 See POWELL, supra note 18, at 36.
27 See id. at 38.
28 See id. at 37-38.
29 See id. at 38.
30 See MUMIA, supra note 24, at 7.
31 See id.; see also Ward, supra note 22, at 3-4 (discussing AIDS incidence in
the early 1990's and explaining fluctuations); id. at 11 (describing the magnitude of
the epidemic and its worldwide transmission).
32 See HIVWAIDS: Recent Developments and Future Opportunities:Hearingon
S. 353 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 49
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states throughout the United States have taken measures to
slow the further spread of the disease. Partner notification as
we know it today was developed initially in the 1930s, as a
means of controlling the spread of the problematic venereal
diseases of that era, most notably syphilis. 33 After some initial
trepidation by the states,34 various partner notification models to
be used in the fight against AIDS found their way to the books.3 5
Although there are several different approaches to partner
notification, what these laws share in common is the objective of
informing those most at risk of contracting HIV-sexual
partners and hypodermic needle-sharing partners of persons
36
already infected.
AIDS and HIV partner notification has been the subject of
much controversy. AIDS is an unusually politicized disease, in
that certain discrete groups, which already consider themselves
somewhat marginalized by society, have seen a disproportionatel
y high incidence of infection. 37 Gay and lesbian organizations, in
particular, have perceived many partner notification measures to
be intrusive and violative of the privacy interests of infected
39
individuals, 38 a substantial number of whom are gay men.

(1997) (presentation by Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Dir., Nat'l Inst. of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, Natl Insts. of Health).
33 See Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventionsin the AIDS
Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 111, 118-19 (1994) (surveying public health strategies for
communicable diseases in general); Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr.,
Piercingthe Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually TransmittedDiseases:
Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in PartnerNotification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 9, 16 (1998) [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil] (discussing the
origins of "contact tracing" in partner notification); ACLU AIDS Project Report,
supra note 13, at ch. II.
34 Apprehension followed from the fact that partner notification schemes were

vehemently opposed by many gay rights organizations. See Gostin & Hodge,
Piercingthe Veil, supra note 33, at 25.
35 See id. at 25-26 (discussing the contemporary practice of contact tracing).
36 See generally id.; see also Doughty, supra note 33, at 118; ACLU AIDS Project
Report, supra note 13, at ch. I.
37

See Doughty, supra note 33, at 118; see also supranotes 10, 12.

See Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate, supra note 11, at 696-97 (discussing the
inception of the modem AIDS epidemic and early attempts at AIDS name
reporting). Ronald S. Johnson, Managing Director for Public Policy for The Gay
Men's Health Crisis (GMHC), the nation's oldest and largest AIDS organization, has
stated that the New York State Department of Health's draft regulations for
partner notification laws "will interfere with efforts to provide services to people
living with HIV and hamper our ability to reduce HIV infection rates among at-risk
populations." GMHC Opposes New York State Health Department's Draft
38

1999]

PARTNER NOTIFICATION LAW

1199

Advocacy groups have aggressively campaigned against many
partner notification measures. 40 New York State is one of the
nation's leaders in sheer numbers of AIDS cases. 41 The class of
advocacy against partner notification in New York appears to be

Regulations on Partner Notification, Mar. 12, 1999 (visited Aug. 6, 1999)
<http://www.thebody.com/gmhc/pr/mar1299.html>. He felt that "[tihese regulations
pose a threat to our attempt to encourage testing for those at risk and treatment for
those already diagnosed as HIV positive." Id. The gay rights group ACT UP believes
that any kind of partner notification would lead to discrimination in employment,

housing, and health care. See Matthew V. Sharp, HIV Name Reporting Rears Its
Ugly Head,Nov. 20, 1997 (visited Aug. 6, 1999) <http://www.actupgg.org/BAR.art
112097.html>. The San Francisco AIDS Foundation believes that "[a] mandatory
notification program would violate the trust between..,
partners."
Toward 2000: An HIV/AIDS PolicyAgenda for CaliforniaHIV Testing and Reporting (visited Aug. 6, 1999) <http:/www.sfaf.orgpolicy/caagenda99/testing.html>.
39 See POWELL, supranote 18, at 34-37.
40 See Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate, supra note 11, at 696; see also supra
note 38 and accompanying text (discussing gay activist groups' reactions to partner
notification laws). In addition, many non-gay groups oppose partner notification
laws. The National Organization for Women (N.O.W.) opposes partner notification
laws on the grounds that they will exacerbate the AIDS crisis in New York by
deterring individuals from seeking diagnostic testing and health care. See The
National Organization for Women, supra note 12. The New York Academy of
Medicine similarly believes that partner notification laws will deter people from
being tested for HIV and could promote domestic violence when partners are
informed by strangers of potential exposure. See The Council of AIDS Program
Directors and HIV Ambulatory Care Clinical Directors, The New York Academy of
Medicine, supra note 12, at 2. The American Psychological Association Policy Action
Network for Women Living with H1V/AIDS (PANWHA) opposes any kind of partner
notification because it would place an unnecessary financial burden on states and
divert resources from other, more effective HIV prevention strategies. See Policy
Action Network for Women Living with HPVIAIDS (PANWHA) Opposes the Socalled 'HIVPreventionAct of 1997' (visited Nov. 13, 1999)<http://vw.apa.org/ppo/
coburn.html>. PANWHA posits that mandatory notification of women's HIVpositive status to their male sexual partners will lead to physical and emotional
abuse. See id. There are groups, however, that support partner notification as an
effective measure in reducing the spread of AIDS. The Journal of the American
Medical Association, for example, states that partner notification could be crucial in
"breaking the chain of transmission." JAMA Women's Health STD Information
Center Report PartnerNotification and Management of Sex Partners(visited Nov.
13, 1999) <http'/www.amaassn.org/special/std/treatmnt/guide/stdg3408.htm>.
41 See Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate, supra note 11, at 710 (explaining that
New York and California have more AIDS cases than any other state). The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report
indicated that, as of December 1998, there were 128,675 reported cases of AIDS in
New York and 110,056 cases in California. These two states combined account for
over one third of the 664,921 total reported cases of AIDS. In fact, the combined
figure tops the next seven highest totals combined (New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Florida, Georgia, fllinois, and Maryland). United States HIV & AIDS
Statistics by State (visited Sept. 25, 1999) <http://www.avert.org/usastats.htm>.
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quite high. It is against this backdrop which New York
introduced Title III of the Public Health Law.

II. PARTNER NOTIFICATION LAWS, GENERALLY
In order to understand the manner in which New York's
Title III differs from the status quo in partner notification, it is
necessary to examine the more common partner notification
schemes in operation in other states. 42 A review of these
statutes reveals substantial diversity in approach from one state
to the next.43 Nevertheless, several broad categories of partner
notification methods do become clear. At the outset, it should be
noted that many states have statutes which utilize multiple
partner notification methods alternatively. 44 Furthermore, there
are some approaches which do not belong in any one category. 45

42 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 33, at 27-32, 47-51
(enumerating a complete list of partner notification statutes in use throughout the
United States); ACLUAIDS ProjectReport,supra note 13 (same).
43 For example, New Jersey permits partner notification only upon a court
order. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1996). In contrast, California allows
physicians to notify spouses, sexual partners, and needle-sharing partners directly,
requiring no court order. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering
1997). There is also diversity amongst the statutes on the issue of whether a
physician has an affirmative duty to warn. For example, Michigan has created an
affirmative duty for physicians and local health officers to notify the partner. See
MICH COMP. LAWS § 333.5131(5)(b) (West 1998). Physicians in West Virginia have
no such duty. See W. VA. CODE § 16-3c-3(e) (1998).
4 New York itself has several different forms of partner notification on the
books. Among them are what this Note terms a "Notification by Petition" provision,
a "Permissive Direct Notification" provision, and, of course, the new Title III. See
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2785, 2782(4), 2130-2139 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(respectively). New York also has a law requiring HIV testing of all newborn which
allows for limited disclosures. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney Supp.
1999); Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn, The "Baby AIDS" Bill, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 721, 721-22 (1997) (discussing the Bill's background and the need to
disclose that a baby has tested HIV-positive). Other states that allow for partner
notification both by a physician and by court order include Pennsylvania and
Louisiana. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1300.14 E(1), 40:1300.15 (West 1992); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 7608-7609 (West 1993).
45 For example, Colorado's enactments are not partner notification laws per se.
They are, nevertheless, laws designed to curb the spread of HIV, requiring infected
individuals to cease and desist from certain specified conduct (presumably sexual
activity) if so ordered by the authorities, and allowing uncooperative individuals to
be temporarily incarcerated for noncompliance. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-4-140625-4-1407 (1998); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 810 (West 1992) (allowing
for incarceration of an HIV infected person who becomes an imminent danger to
public health); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.4-01 (1991 & Sulp. 1997).
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The broad categories of partner notification laws are identified
and discussed below.
A. Notification by Petition

Certainly the least intrusive means of partner notification is
what might be termed "Notification by Petition." Under this
approach, an individual may petition a court to disclose another
person's HIV/AIDS status, notwithstanding traditional
46
confidentiality protections concerning one's medical condition.
Although, generally this recourse is not explicitly limited to
47
sexual or needle-sharing partners of the subject in question,
certainly a spouse or partner of a person suspected to have HIV
or AIDS could file such a petition. Accordingly, this is a means
of partner notification. 48
Whereas some codes are vague or silent as to the legal
standards involved, 49 most provide some guidance as to what
courts should, or must consider, in reaching their
determinations. 50 Commonly, statutes permit the courts to order
disclosure of the subject's AIDS/HIV status where the petitioner
has shown a "compelling need" for the information. 51 States such

4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(a)(10)(a) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:5C-9(a) (West 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a)(9) (1998).
47 For example, Ohio's provision states: "Any person or government agency may
seek access to or authority to disclose the HIV test records of an individual..
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(C)(1) (Anderson 1997) (emphasis added).
48 In its survey of nation-wide partner notification laws, the ACLU includes
several citations to petition-style statutory provisions. See ACLU AIDS Project
Report, supra note 13.
49 For example, North Carolina apparently allows judicial orders of disclosure,
without positing any standards of review: "[AIDS/HIV status] information shall not
be released or made public except under the following circumstances... (6) Release
is made pursuant to a subpoena or court order." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-143 (1995);
see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-D(2)(E) (West 1989); OKL& STAT. tit.
63, § 1-502.2(A)(1) (Supp. 1999).
r0 See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
61 "The court may issue an order granting the plaintiff access to or authority to
disclose the [HIV/AIDS] test results only if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling need for disclosure of the
information that cannot be accommodated by other means." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.243(C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(a)(10)(a)
(1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.4-01(4) (SUPP. 1997) (allowing a court ordered
disclosure of someone's HIV/AIDS status to his partners only upon clear and
convincing evidence that disclosure is necessary); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608
(West 1993); IV. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a)(9) (Supp. 1999).
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Ohio, 53 Pennsylvania, 5 4 and West Virginia 55

measure whether a need is "compelling" through virtually
identical balancing tests. Ordinarily, the courts must "weigh the
need for disclosure against the privacy interest of the individual
56
and the public interests which may be harmed by disclosure."
These "public interests" which may be harmed are specifically
identified in some states as the deterrence of future voluntary
AIDS/HIV testing by the public, and the engendering of
57

discrimination.

Although New Jersey 58 and Washington 59 purport to use a
"good cause" standard rather than the nominally more stringent
"compelling need" approach, those states utilize comparable, if
not more exacting balancing tests.60 Michigan 61 and the District
of Columbia 62 opt for less defined but, perhaps, more flexible
standards. The District of Columbia, for instance, permits a
court to order disclosure simply when the court finds "upon clear
and convincing evidence.., that disclosure.., is essential to
safeguard the physical health of others."63
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(a)(10)(a) (1995).
53 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997).
52

54 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608(c) (West 1993).
55 See W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a)(9)(i) (1998).
56 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608(c) (West 1993); see also FLA STAT. ch. 381.004

(3)(e)(9)(a) (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300:15 E (West 1992).
57 See FLA. STAT. ch. 381.004 (3)(e)(9)(a) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.243 (C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997).
58 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1996).
59 See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(f) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000).
60 New Jersey contemplates that, "[a]t a good cause hearing the court shall
weigh the public interest and need for disclosure against the injury to the person
who is the subject of the record, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the
services offered by the program." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1996); see also
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(f) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000) ("In assessing good
cause, the court shall weigh the public interest and the need for disclosure against
the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the treatment
services.").
61 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5131(3)(a) (1992 & Supp. 1999).
62 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-117(b)(1)(B) (1995).
63 Id. Similarly, Michigan permits an order to disclose only when the court has
determined: (i) "[tihat other ways of obtaining the information are not available or
would not be effective;" and "(ii) [tihat the public interest and need for the disclosure
outweigh the potential for injury to the patient." MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.5131(3)(a) (1992 & Supp. 1999). Other states that have flexible standards
include Ohio and North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-143(4) (1995) (listing
circumstances in which AIDS test results may be released, including when
"[rielease is necessary to protect the public health"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.243(C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997) ("The court may issue an order granting...
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Whatever standard is used to determine whether disclosure
is appropriate, most statutes of this variety expressly limit the
range of information the court may in fact disclose. Several
states compel their courts to "guard against unauthorized
disclosure by specifying the persons who may have access to the
information, the purposes for which the information shall be
used, and prohibitions against future disclosure." 64 Washington,
Michigan, and New Jersey further limit the scope of disclosure
by requiring that courts consider and make determinations as to
which portions of a sought record may be disclosed.65 Petitioners
must endure the costly and time-consuming nature of the court
system, negotiate unwelcoming balancing tests and face even
further limitation tailored to protect individuals infected with
AIDS/HIV. Thus, it seems clear that notification by petition is
not the most rapid or efficient means of partner notification.
B. PermissiveDirectPhysicianNotification
The most frequently encountered partner notification
method might be labeled "Permissive Direct Physician
Notification." 66 A number of states permit direct partner
notification by physicians, including California, 67 Florida, 68
Illinois, 69 Alabama, 70 Connecticut, 7 1 Georgia, 72 Iowa,73 Montana,7 4
authority to disclose the test results only if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling need for disclosure....").
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(C)(1)(c) (Anderson 1997); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(a)(10)(e) (1995).; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West
1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608(h)(4) (West 1993).
65 See WASI-L REV. CODE § 70.24.105(f) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000) (providing in
part: "An order authorizing disclosure shall: (i) Limit disclosure to those parts of the
patient's record deemed essential to fulfill the objective for which the order was
granted...."). Michigan has a similar provision, as does New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5131(3)(b) (1992 & Supp. 1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7608(h)(1) (West
1993).
0 A considerable number of states utilize this method. See infra notes 67-82
and accompanying text.
67 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997).
68 See FLA. STAT. ch. 455.674(1) (1999), amended by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-8
§220.
69 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9(a) (1999).
70 See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38(d) (1997).
71 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584(b) (1999). Connecticut's statute is somewhat
more limited than most. It provides that a physician may directly notify a known
partner of an infected individual's IUV status only if both the infected individual
and the partner are under the physician's care. See id. If the partner is not under
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Pennsylvania,7 5 Kansas, 76 Rhode Island, 77 South Carolina, 78
82
81
Virginia, 79 Tennessee,8 0 Washington, and West Virginia.
Statutes utilizing this method permit physicians to notify
the sexual or drug needle-sharing partners of infected
individuals of the pertinent risks of exposure. 83 The information
flows directly from the doctor who has discovered the infection
(via testing procedures, etc.) to those individuals who are at risk
the physician's care, then the physician's only means of notification is to report the
matter to a public health officer. See id. The health officer, in turn, may notify the
partner. See id.
72 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(g) (1995).
73 See IOWA CODE § 141.6 (1999).
74 See MONT. CODE ANN. §50-16-1009(3) (1997).

Montana's statute is somewhat
ambiguous as to the degree of authority it confers upon physicians to disclose, and
may only permit the physician to solicit the cooperation of the infected individual,
providing that "[ilf the subject is unable or unwilling to notify all contacts, the
health care provider may ask the subject to disclose voluntarily the identities of the
contacts and to authorize notification of those contacts." Id.
75 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(a) (West 1993).
76 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6004(b) (1992 & Supp. 1998), amended by 1999
Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4.
77 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-17(2)(v) (1996).
78 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
79 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(11) (Michie 1997).
80 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-115 (1996) (providing that "[a] person who has
a reasonable belief that a person has knowingly exposed another to HIV may inform
the potential victim without incurring any liability").
81 See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(2)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000).
82 See W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1998).
83 For example, Georgia law states:
When the patient of a physician has been determined to be infected with HIV
and that patient's physician reasonably believes that the spouse or sexual
partner or any child of the patient, spouse, or sexual partner is a person at risk
of being infected with HIV by that patient, the physician may disclose to that
spouse, sexual partner, or child that the patient has been determined to be
infected with HIV, after first attempting notify the patient that such disclosure
is going to be made.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(g) (1995). Another example may be found in the laws of
Kansas, which provide:
[A] physician who has reason to believe that the spouse or partner of a person
who has had laboratory confirmation of HIV infection or who has AIDS may
have been exposed to HIV and is unaware of such exposure may inform the
spouse or partner of the risk of exposure.
1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4 (amending KAN STAT. ANN. § 65.6004(b) (1992 &
Supp. 1998)); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997)
("[No physician and surgeon... shall be held criminally or civilly liable for
disclosing to a person reasonably believed to be the spouse, or to a person
reasonably believed to be a sexual partner or a person with whom the patient has
shared the use of hypodermic needles ... that the patient has tested positive on a[n
[HIV detection] test .
").
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of contracting the disease.84 These statutes tend to explicitly
exempt physicians from any civil or criminal liability for their
disclosures, provided that the disclosing physician has complied
with any other requirements which may be imposed. 85 In
marked contrast to Notification by Petition methods, the courts
are not involved. That is, these acts, on their faces, confer a
limited authority upon physicians to make carefully defined
86
disclosures, without requiring judicial orders.
The question of paramount importance is, under precisely
what circumstances is partner notification permitted? Each
state has its own answer.
The authority to disclose seems to be at its broadest in those
states which permit notification to certain persons simply by
virtue of the nature of their relationship to the infected
individual. 87 Most notably, California's statute suggests such an
approach. 88 In that state:
[No physician... who has the results of a confirmed positive
[AIDS/HIV] test... of a patient under his care shall be held
criminally or civilly liable for disclosing to a person reasonably
believed to be the spouse, or to a person reasonably believed to
be a sexual partner or a person with whom the patient has
shared the use of hypodermic
needles... that the patient has
89
tested positive ....

Similarly, Kansas authorizes disclosure to spouses and
sexual partners but makes no comparable provision for needlesharing contacts.9 0 Virginia tailors its act even more narrowly,
84 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-9-47(g) (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65.6004(b) (1992 & Supp. 1998),
amended by 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4.

85 "Any physician who discloses ...

information in

accordance

with the

provisions of this section in good faith and without malice shall have immunity from
any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed in an
action resulting from such disclosure." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6004(d) (Supp. 1998),
amended by 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 109 §4; see also ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38(f)
(1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997); FLA. STAT. ch.
455.674(1) (1999), amended by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-8 §220; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/9(a) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(c)-(d) (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §

44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
86 These provisions are entirely bereft of any reference to the courts.
87 See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
88 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015 (Deering 1997).

89 Id. § 121015(a) (emphasis added).
9D See 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4 (amending KAN STAT. ANN. § 65.6004(b)
(1992 & Supp. 1998)).
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In contrast, South

Carolina permits notification to both spouses and other
"contacts."9 2
The majority of direct partner notification states do not
share this approach of permitting disclosure to certain relations
of the patient without further qualification. Rather, the more
common approach is to promulgate an ethical standard of sorts,
at which it becomes appropriate to disclose, regardless of what
relations of the patient may be informed.
Several states impose some variation of the same standard,
focusing primarily on the physician's opinion of the threat posed.
Alabama, for instance, permits disclosure to a "third party" in
cases "where there is a foreseeable, real or probable risk of
transmission of the disease."9 3 Some states offer less refined
qualifications for the degree of risk required, such as Georgia"
and Washington. 95 Others, however, formulate slightly more
96
stringent standards, such as Iowa's "imminent danger" test,

[A] physician who has reason to believe that the spouse of a person who has had
a positive reaction to an AIDS test, laboratory confirmation of HIV infection or
who has AIDS... and is unaware of such exposure may inform the spouse or
partner of the risk of exposure. The information shall be confidential and shall
not be disclosed by such spouse or partner to other persons ....
Id.
91 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(11) (Michie 1997). The act is seemingly
broader, providing 12 categories of persons to whom disclosures may be made.
These categories, however, encompass mainly legal representatives, health care
department providers/staff or researchers. With respect to personal relationships
only the parents of a minor or the spouse are mentioned. See id. § 32.1-36.1(A)(10)(11).
92 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). "Contact" is defined as
"the exchange of body products or body fluids by sexual acts or percutaneous
transmission." Id.
93 ALA CODE § 22-11A-38(d) (1997).
94 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(g) (1995). The nature of the risk involved here
is not clearly defined. Disclosure to spouses, sexual partners, and children of the
patient is permitted when the "physician reasonably believes [that such people are]
at risk of being infected with HIV by that patient." Id.
95 See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(2)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000). Notice
may be given to "[p]ersons who, because of their behavioral interaction with the
infected individual, have been placed at risk for acquisition of a sexually
transmitted disease." Id.
96 IOWA CODE § 141.6(3)(c)(1) (1999). One condition for disclosure to sexual and
needle-sharing partners is that "[a] physician for the infected person is of the good
faith opinion that the nature of the continuing contact poses an imminent danger of
human immunodeficiency virus infection transmission to the third party." Id.
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and Rhode Island's "clear and present danger" standard.97 To
render disclosure permissible, Tennessee, uniquely, requires
only that a disclosing party have a "reasonable belief that a
person has knowingly exposed another to HIV."98 Furthermore,
the right to disclose in Tennessee is not confined to physicians. 99
Still other states determine the point at which notification is
appropriate by examining more explicitly the conduct of the
infected individual subsequent to the discovery of infection. In
Florida, for instance, physicians may not notify sexual and
needle-sharing partners of the infected individual unless such
individual refuses to "refrain from engaging in sexual or drug
activity in a manner likely to transmit the virus," after the
physician has recommended that the individual cease such
activity. 100 Illinois permits notification if, upon "a reasonable
time after the patient has agreed to make the notification, the
physician has reason to believe that the patient has not provided
the notification." 1 1
It is common for direct notification statutes to incorporate
some protections of the interests of the infected individual. For
example, a number of states require that the physician forewarn
the patient that a notification is going to be made, in order to
provide the patient with an opportunity to personally notify
partners. 102 The majority of states in this group, including,
California, 10 3 Connecticut,' °4 Iowa, 10 5 and Pennsylvania,' °6 offer

97 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-17(2)(v) (1996). "A physician: (v) [m]ay inform third
parties with whom an AIDS-infected patient is in close and continuous contact,
including but not limited to a spouse; if the nature of the contact, in the physician's
opinion, poses a clear and present danger of AIDS transmission to the third
part.... ."Id.
98 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-115 (1996).
99 See id. (permitting any "person" to avail herself of the statute subject to its
other provisions).
10D FLA. STAT. ch. 455.674(1)(b) (1999), amended by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-8
§220.
101 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9(a) (1999).
102 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015M,) (Deering 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-584(b)(2) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(g) (1995); IOWA CODE §
141.6(3)(c)(2) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(a)(3) (West 1993).
103 "The physician and surgeon shall notify the patient of his intent to notify the
patients contacts prior to any notification." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
121015(b) (Deering 1997).
104 "A physician may warn or inform a known partner of a protected individual

if... the physician has informed the protected individual of his intent to make such
disclosure to the partner... ." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584(b) (1999).
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clauses which unequivocally require that the infected individual
actually receive such notice prior to any disclosure to third
parties. 10 7 A less common formulation is found in Georgia,
where it is sufficient for the physician to attempt to notify the
patient that a disclosure is going to be made. 0 8
More importantly, several states forbid the physician from
actually divulging the identity of the infected person when
making the disclosure. 109 Hence, in California, a physician may
inform a partner of the infected individual that he or she has had
sexual or needle-sharing contact with a person who has tested
positive for AIDS/HIV, but "no physician... shall disclose any
identifying information about the individual believed to be
infected." 110
Similar measures are taken in Connecticut,"'
112
Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia. 113 Several states are silent
or ambiguous, however, as to whether a patient's identity may be
disclosed, 114 while others specifically provide that the identity of
the infected individual may be revealed. 115

105 A physician may notify third parties "[w]hen the physician believes in good
faith that the infected person, despite strong encouragement, has not and will not
warn the third party and will not participate in the voluntary partner notification
program." IOWA CODE § 141.6(3)(c)(2) (1999).
106 "[A] physician may disclose confidential HIV-related information if all of the
following conditions are met:... (3) [tlhe physician has counseled the subject
regarding the need to notify the contact, and the physician reasonably believes the
subject will not inform the contact ...
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(a) (West
1993).
107 See supra notes 103-106.
108 "[The physician may disclose to that spouse, sexual partner, or child that
the patient has been determined to be infected with HIV, after first attempting to
notify the patient that such disclosure is going to be made." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-947(g) (1995) (emphasis added).
109 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-584(b) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(b) (West 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1998).
110 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997).
M "The physician or public health officer shall not disclose the identity of the
protected individual or the identity of any other partner." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a584(b) (1999).
112 "When making such disclosure to a contact, the physician shall not disclose
the identity of the subject or any other contact." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(b)
(West 1993).
113 "The name or identity of the person whose HIV test result was positive is to
remain confidential." W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1998).
114 A number of statutes do not clearly define just what may be disclosed. In
particular, these do not expressly state whether the infected individual's identity
should be revealed, or protected. See FLA. STAT. ch. 455.674 (1999), amended by
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In some states, further protections expressly forbid notified
partners from sharing or disclosing the information they have
received from the physician, concerning the infected
individual. 116 Washington, for example, provides that notified
spouses or partners are to be furnished with the following
written admonition upon notification:
This information has been disclosed to you from records whose
confidentiality is protected by state law. State law prohibits
you from making any further disclosure of it without the
specific written consent of the person to whom it pertains, or as
otherwise permitted by state law. A general authorization for
the release of medical or other information is NOT sufficient for
this purpose.117
Perhaps the most important feature these statutes share in
common is the permissive nature of the physician's authority.
Under these acts, the physician has no legal duty to notify
partners of the infected individual. 118 Disclosure is merely
permitted. As such, the physician may, if he or she so chooses,
remain silent as to a patient's condition.
In this respect,
Permissive Direct Notification differs substantially from

1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-8 §220; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-6004 (1992 & Supp. 1998), amended by 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4.
115 "[Tihe department or a physician may reveal the identity of a person who
has tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus infection pursuant to this
subsection only to the extent necessary to protect a third party from the direct
threat of transmission." IOWA CODE § 141.6(3)(c)(2) (1999); see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.24.105(2)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000).
116 See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(5) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000); W. VA.
CODE § 16-3C-3(b) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
117 WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.105(5) (1998 & Supp. 1999-2000).
118 Virtually every statute in this category contains a provision expressly
declaring that the physician has no legal duty to notify, or shall incur no civil or
criminal liability for failure to notify. For example, California provides: "This section
is permissive on the part of the attending physician... [n]o physician has a duty to
notify any person of the fact that a patient is reasonably believed to be infected by
the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(c) (Deering 1997); see also ALA. CODE § 22-11A38(f) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584(b) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. 455.674(2)
(1999), amended by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-8 §220; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9(a)
(1999); IOWA CODE § 141.6(3)(c)(2) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6004(c) (1992 &
Supp. 1998), amended by 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 109 §4; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
7609(c) (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1(D) (Michie 1997); W. VA. CODE § 163C-3(e) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
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mandatory names-reporting laws, 119 such as New York's Title
III.120
2
C. PermissiveNames Reporting' '

Another significant permissive partner notification model
allows physicians to report the names of their HIV-positive
patients to a state health agency, whereupon the agency

undertakes the task of notifying the infected individual's at-risk
sexual or needle-sharing partners. 122 Unlike Direct Physician
Notification, the state itself becomes an active player in the
notification process and necessarily becomes aware of the
infected individual's HIV-positive status. 123 A state, however,
may offer this method of notification to physicians in conjunction
with and as an alternative to Direct Physician Notification. 124
States utilizing permissive names reporting include California,
12 Georgia,126 West Virginia, 127 Maryland, 1' Arizona, 129 Hawaii,
119 See discussion infra Part III.
120 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2130-2139 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
121 The term "names reporting" is used by many commentators to describe
systems in which physicians are permitted or required to forward the names of their
HIV-positive patients to a public health agency. See Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate,
supra note 11, at 696-97; Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 33, at 2627; Doughty, supra note 36, at 118-20.
122 This result may be accomplished through separate, yet interconnected
statutes. For instance, one Indiana law permits physicians to report an infected
individual (and the identities of his at-risk partners) if the physician has reasonable
cause to believe that the individual poses a serious danger to the health of others.
See IND. CODE § 16-41-7-3(b)(1)-(2) (1993-98). Meanwhile, another Indiana law
permits the state health agency receiving the report to notify specified at-risk
persons. See IND. CODE § 16-41-7-4(c) (1993-98).
123 For example, in Georgia:
[wihen mandatory and nonanonymous reporting of confirmed positive HIV
tests to the Department of Human Resources is determined by that department
to be reasonably necessary... [any] legal entity which orders an HIV test for
another person shall report to the Department of Human Resources the name
and address of any person thereby determined to be infected with HIV.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(h)(2) (1995).
124 California, for instance, permits disclosure to either at-risk partners, or the

county health officer, in the same statutory provision. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997).
'm3 See id. § 121015(a), (d).
126 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(h)(1), (3).
127 See W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a) (1998 & Supp. 1999) (describing when the
identity of a person upon whom an HIV-related test is performed can be revealed);
id. § 16-3C-3(d) (stating HIV results may be revealed to certain persons, but the
name or identity of the person whose test result is positive remains confidential).
128 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-337(b), (d) (Supp. 1998).
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130 and Indiana. 131 As with other partner notification methods,

there is some variation in approach from state to state.
Some states, such as California, West Virginia, and Georgia,
permit a physician to report the infected individual's name
simply upon the determination that the patient is HIVpositive. 13 2 In these states no further standard is imposed, nor is
a perceived risk to others required in order to justify names
reporting. In contrast, Maryland permits physicians to report
names of infected individuals only when an individual informed
of his "HIV-positive status ... refuses to notify [his] sexual and
needle-sharing partners."133 Similar standards are followed in
Arizona and Hawaii. 3 4 Indiana, more broadly, permits reporting
where the infected individual may be deemed a "serious and
135
present danger to the health of others."
Some states also expressly allow physicians to report the
identities of the at-risk partners. 13 6 Hence, in Arizona, "it is not
an act of unprofessional conduct for a physician to report.., the
name of a patient's spouse or sex partner or a person with whom
the patient has shared hypodermic needles .... ."137 States that
do not use such a method may utilize a procedure known as
"contact tracing," in which a state health agency attempts to
solicit, from the infected individual, a list of his sexual and
needle sharing contacts, as well as investigate to ascertain those
M2See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1860(A) (West 1992).
130 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101(a)(4) (1993 & Supp. 1996).
131 See IND. CODE § 16-41-7-3(b)(1)-(2) (1993-98); id. § 16-41-7-4(c) (1993-98).
132

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (Deering 1997) ("[lNo

physician... shall be held criminally or civilly liable for disclosing.., to the county
health officer, that [a] patient has tested positive [for HIV."); GA. CODE ANN. § 249-47(h)(1) (1995) ("[A] physician having a patient who has been determined to be
infected with HIV may disclose to the Department of Human Resources: (A) The
name and address of that patient."); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a) (1998 & Supp. 1999)
("No person may disclose.., the identity of any person upon whom an HIV-related
test is performed, or the results... except to... (6) The bureau or the centers for
disease control.").
133 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-337(b) (1994).
13 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1860(A) (West 1992);

HAW. REV. STAT. §

325-101(a)(4)(B) (1993 & Supp. 1996).
135 IND. CODE § 16-41-7-3(b)(1)(A) (1993-98).
136 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1860(A) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-

47(h)(1)(C) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101(a)(4)(B) (1993 & Supp. 1996) ("Any
determination by a physician to disclose or withhold disclosure of an index patient's
sexual contacts to the department of health... which is made in good faith shall not
be subject to penalties .... ").
137 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1860(A) (West 1992).
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contacts not reported by the individual. 138 In the end, the state
may generally "alert any persons reasonably believed to be a
spouse, sexual partner, or partner of shared needles" of the risk
of exposure. 139
Some states forbid health agencies from
revealing to informed partners the identity of the infected
140
individual.
It is valuable to stress once more that states in this class do
not impose any duty on physicians to report the names of their
HIV-positive patients. 141 Reporting is simply permitted, and the
decision to do so on the part of the doctor is strictly voluntary.
III. NEW YORK'S TITLE III PARTNER NOTIFICATION LAW:
MANDATORY NAMES REPORTING

The new Title III to Article 21 of the New York Public
Health Law 142 supplements New York's pre-existing, lessaggressive partner notification measures. 143 The law's purpose,
as described by its sponsors, is to "protect spouses, sexual and
needle sharing partners and other contacts of persons testing
positive for HIV by permitting public health officials to notify
them that they may have been placed at risk of contracting HIV
and that they should be tested."144 Some of the political thrust to
enact Title III seems to have come from the furor over the recent
case of Nushawn Williams, an HIV-positive New York City man
who knowingly infected several women throughout upstate New
York.145

138 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 33, at 25, 32.

139 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(d) (Deering 1997); see also GA. CODE

ANN. § 24-9-47(h)(1) (1995) (requiring the state's Department of Human Resources
to both contact and provide counseling for the at-risk spouse of an HIV infected
person); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
140 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(d) (Deering 1997); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-3C-3(d) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
141 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1860(C) (West 1992); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 121015(c) (Deering 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(h)(3) (1995)
(stating "a physician... may disclose") (emphasis added); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. I § 18-337(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (stating "the ... physician may inform the
local health officer") (emphasis added).
142 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2130-2139 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
14 See supra note 5.
144 Memorandum in Support of Legislation from the New York State Assembly
1 (undated) (on file with author).
145 See New York Assemblywoman Mayersohn, Statement on Partner
Notification Bill A6629 2 (Mar. 24, 1998) (on file with author). Assemblywoman
Mayersohn describes recent attention paid to the Williams case, and bemoans the
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The most striking feature of Title III is that it imposes an
affirmative duty on all licensed physicians to report the names of
their patients testing positive for HIV. As the Act reads, "[e]very
physician or other person authorized by law to order diagnostic
tests or make a medical diagnosis, or any laboratory performing
such tests shall immediately... report such case to the [public
health] commissioner."146 Although compulsory names reporting
of those with certain medical conditions is not a first for New
York,147 this is the first time such a measure has been taken
with respect to HIV. A similar provision in Title III applies to
coroners and medical examiners, contemplating that if such
individuals discover that a deceased person was afflicted with
HIV or AIDS at the time of his death, they, likewise, are
obligated to report the matter to the health commissioner. 148
After a physician, or other practitioner covered by the Act,
informs the health department of a patient's HIV-positive status,
the commissioner promptly forwards the report to "the health
commissioner of the municipality where such disease, illness or
infection occurred." 149 This report must include, if available, the

names of any "contacts" of the infected individual. 150 A "contact"
is defined in the Public Health Law as "an identified spouse or
absence of any responsibility on the part of doctors who discover that their patients
have HIV. See id.; see also Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People with
H.I.V, N.Y. TZIES, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al (discussing the controversy surrounding
the Williams incident). Some, however, believe that the New York legislation would
have done nothing to prevent the infections spread by Williams, as many of
Williams' victims had already been infected by the time he learned of his own
infection. See JoAnn Wypijewski, The Secret Sharer: Sex, Race, and Denial in an
American Small Town, HARPER'S MAG See JoAnn Wypijewski, The Secret Sharer:
Sex, Race, and Denial in an American Small Town, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 1998,
at 35. In addition, Williams went by a host of aliases that would have made
reporting largely ineffective. See id. The Williams case is not unique, and similar
cases in other jurisdictions have been the catalyst for state officials seeking state
resources for the purpose of deterring individuals like Williams. See Susan Levine,
Behaviorof HIV CarriersPosesDilemma, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,1999, at B1.
146 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
147 See id. § 2222 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (requiring physicians report to
local health officers the names ofthose who have contracted tuberculosis); id. § 2401
(requiring physicians to report to the Department of Health the names of those
afflicted with cancer).
148 See id. § 2132 (McKinney Supp. 1999) ("If a coroner, pathologist, medical
examiner, or other person qualified to conduct an examination of a deceased person
discovers that at the time of death the individual was afflicted with... HIV
infection, he or she shall report the case promptly...
149 Id. § 2130(2).
160 Id. § 2130(3).
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sex partner of the protected individual, a person identified as
having shared hypodermic needles... with the protected
individual or a person who the protected individual may have
exposed to HIV under circumstances that present a risk of
transmission of HIV, as determined by the commissioner."'1 1
Once the report has been referred to the local or municipal
heath authority, that agency has an affirmative duty to
undertake partner notification. 152 First, if the referral included
the names of any contacts residing in the local agency's
153
jurisdiction, the local agency must approach those contacts.
Second, if the local health authority determines that it is
necessary, it may commence contact tracing to ascertain the
identities of other contacts of the infected individual. 1' Title III
mandates that the Health Department develop protocols to
screen and protect likely victims of domestic violence, who, as
infected individuals or contacts, may be subject to abuse as a
result of a notification. 155
The notification itself is to be made in person, unless
circumstances prevent it.156 The contact is informed of the
nature of HIV, generally, the known routes of HIV transmission,
actions which can limit further transmission, and local facilities
and organizations which can provide HIV-related care, medical
treatment and counseling. 157 One of Title III's most important
features is what may not be disclosed to the contact: The
identity of the infected individual. 158 Furthermore, the health
authority may not disclose to the contact the name of any other
contact of the infected individual. 159 To generally safeguard the
confidentiality of the infected individual's HIV-positive status,
Title III provides that "[all reports or information secured by the
department, municipal health commissioner or district health
officer under the provisions of this title shall be confidential
151 Id. § 2780(10) (McKinney 1993), amended by id. (McKinney Supp. 1999).
152 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2131 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (requiring that a

health officer make a good faith effort to identify a contact of possible exposure to

HMI).
153 See id.

124 See id. § 2133(1).
155 See id. § 2137.

166 See id. § 2133(4).
157 See id. § 2133(2). In addition, as circumstances warrant, a contact is
informed of the risks of prenatal and perinatal transmission. See id.
158 See id. § 2133(3).
159 See id.
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except in so far as is necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title."160
Disclosures may only be made to those parties
161
identified herein.
It is clear that Title III, in requiring rather than permitting
notification, and in channeling records of persons' HIV-positive
status through the control of the state government, elevates
partner notification to a more aggressive degree than nearly any
state in the United States. 162 As previously discussed, the
political opposition to Title III was substantial and furious.
Given New York's volatile political climate with respect to issues
of AIDS/HIV and disclosure, it seems highly probable that a
challenge to Title III will be forthcoming in one form or another.
Although much is made of the detrimental impact of partner
notification on confidentiality, 1' confidentiality is a statutory
creature in New York. 1
That is to say, if the legislature can
create it, the legislature can destroy it, or, as the case may be
here, restrict it. Challengers, therefore, would likely resort to
constitutional grounds. Although the right of privacy might be
an attractive basis of attack to such parties, for the reasons set
forth below, Title III should survive a right of privacy challenge.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Generally
Although the Constitution is, by its nature, an ambiguous
instrument which confounds "black letter" application, 165 few
160 Id. § 2135.

161 See id. § 2134.
Michigan, however, has a somewhat similar statute. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.5131 (1992 & Supp. 1999).
16 See Doughty, supra note 33, at 163-75 (examining the grave personal
consequences that a breach of confidentiality has on disclosure of AIDSIHIV).
164 In fact, New York has a statute contemplating confidentiality of BIV-related
information. It provides:
No person who obtains confidential HIV related information in the course of
providing any health or social service or pursuant to a release of confidential
HIT related information may disclose or be compelled to disclose such
information, except to... the protected individual.., an agent or employee of a
health facility [or] ... a federal, state, county or local health officer ....
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999).
16 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, the Constitution's nature:
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced
from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by
162
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constitutional protections have proven to be as elusive in
meaning and scope as the so-called right of privacy. 166 Perhaps
this is due in part to the fact that the Constitution itself does not
explicitly guarantee any right of privacy,167 but, rather, the right
has been found, time and again, to exist implicitly within several
express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 168 As the Supreme
Court explained in Griswold v. Connecticut,169 "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."170 These penumbras coalesce to create "zones of
privacy,"171 which, with respect to certain human activities,
confer upon individuals a "right to be let alone"' 72 and
undisturbed by intrusive state regulation. The Griswold Court
borrowed from the penumbras of the First Amendment's right of
association, 173 the Third Amendment's prohibition against the
the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the
nature of the instrument, but from the language.
M Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
16 See Lagitch, supra note 14, at 109; Kevin J. Cumin, Note, Newborn HZV
Screeningand New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy and Equal Protectionof
Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 869 (1993) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973) in a discussion of the right to privacy versus mandatory HIV
testing and disclosure).
16 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding zones of privacy to exist
under the Constitution, although the Constitution itself makes no explicit mention
of a right to privacy); Cumin, supra note 166, at 869 (noting the Supreme Court's
difficulty in defining the contours of a right to privacy).
168See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that
.zones of privacy" generated from various provisions of the Bill of Rights rendered
invalid a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives); see also Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (stating that the Court's "prior
decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
included only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
169 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
170 Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
171Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
172 Olnstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(finding the right to be "the most comprehensive of rights and the [one] most valued
by civilized men"); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 77-78
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding that individuals have a legitimate "right
to be let alone" in the privacy of the home); Roach v. City of Evansville, 111 F.3d
544, 550 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs claim of a right to privacy by casting it
as a general right to be left alone from unwanted intrusion of the government);
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 359 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that the right to
privacy is best described as the "right to be let alone").
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quartering of soldiers, 174 the Fourth Amendment's protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 175 and Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause 176 to fashion what might
be called a constitutionally guaranteed "right of marital
privacy" 177 sufficient to invalidate a Connecticut statute
178
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons.
Over the years, there has been some difficulty in
determining what types of human activities reside within these
constitutionally protected "zones of privacy." It appears wellsettled that "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy." 179 Protected
activities tend to reflect some notion of traditional American
values, and more than one opinion has urged that the right
"specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.' "180 As such, those rights which have been deemed
"fundamental" tend to revolve around a certain class of similar
173 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting... the
right of the people peaceably to assemble.... "); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
174 See U.S. CONST. amend. M ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner... :); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
175 See U.S. CONST. amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure... against
unreasonable searches and seizures .... "); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
176 See U.S. CONST. amend V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury... nor shall be compelled... to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... "); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484-85.
177 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
178 The Court explained that the law in question "seeks to achieve its goals by
means having a maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship." Id.
at 485.
179 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (internal citation omitted); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47, 951 (1992) (discussing
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and defining "liberty");
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1989) (holding that
an incompetent patient has the right to die provided there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was his wish to do so).
180 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citing Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); see also Moore, 431
U.S. at 504 n.12 (reiterating the importance of both history and tradition as sources
for supplying content to the Constitutional concept of due process); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (explaining that those rights protected are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed").
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activities. Matters pertaining to marriage, 8 1 child-bearing, 8 2
child-rearing, 183 and family relationships 84 are typically viewed
as "fundamental" rights protected within the zones of privacy.
Of course, even where there is a right of privacy in a
particular form of conduct, that right is not absolute. As the
court noted in Roe v. Wade,185 "[tihe Court's decisions recognizing
a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in
areas protected by that right is appropriate.., a State may
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life.

186

B. The Right of Privacy in PersonalInformation
The aforementioned rights of marriage, child-bearing, child
rearing, etc., are described by many courts as privacy rights of
"independence in making certain kinds of important

181See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin
law which required non-custodial parents with obligations to pay child support, to
obtain court permission before marrying); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(invalidating a statute prohibiting interracial marriage); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 48586 (holding that the marital relationship is within the zone of privacy).
182 See Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 877 ("[A] law designed to further the
State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision
before fetal viability [is unconstitutional.]") (citation omitted); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154
(concluding that "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but..
. this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (citations
omitted).
183 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851 (opining that the "law affords
Constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education"); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (recognizing that the right to privacy
encompasses "personal intimacies" such as child-rearing). Legislation too directly
interfering with a parent's right to raise a child as he or she sees fit, in matters such
as education, has been invalidated by the Court. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that an Oregon law requiring children to attend
public schools was unconstitutional).
184 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (invalidating a city ordinance which required
that all occupants of a dwelling must be of the same nuclear family, such that a
woman had been in violation of the ordinance by living with her two grandsons).
185 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
188

Id. at 153-54.
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decisions." 18 7 Such rights are well-established and clearly
defined by the Supreme Court.188 A second type of privacy
interest protected by the Constitution is what has been described
as "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters," or the right of privacy in personal information. 8 9 The
nature of this aspect of the right is less defined. 190
This prong of the right of privacy finds its origins in Whalen
v. Roe, 191 a case which evaluated the constitutionality of a New
York State statute bearing a certain resemblance to Title III.
The act considered in Whalen required all physicians prescribing
certain drugs to report to the New York State Department of
Health the name, address, and age of the patient receiving the
prescription, as well as the drug and dosage. 192 The statute was
challenged by a group of patients regularly receiving the
prescription drugs in question, as well as physicians who
routinely prescribed the drugs. 193 The challengers alleged that
the Act threatened both varieties of their right of privacy-the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions, and the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal

187 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnote omitted). See Nixon v.
Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (finding that public officials,
including Presidents, have constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of
personal life); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980) (recognizing that an interest in making certain decisions independently is a
privacy interest warranting constitutional protection).

188 See supra notes 181-86.
189 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599

(footnote omitted); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457;
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
190 It appears at this point that Whalen and Nixon are the Court's only
expressions of this aspect of the right of privacy.
191 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Whalen is recognized as the source of the right to
privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal matters in Nixon. See 433 U.S. at 457; see
also Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that there is a constitutional right to privacy in one's
prescription record because one has an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
information); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577 (holding that an employee's medical
records which may contain personal facts are entitled to privacy protection);
Gruenke v. Seip, No. 97-5454, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16439, at *34-35 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
21, 1998) (recognizing the right to be free from disclosure of personal matters).
192 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593. Physicians were to report the prescription of
drugs such as "opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines
and methaqualone [which] ... have accepted uses in the amelioration of pain and in

the treatment of epilepsy, narcolepsy, hyperkineoia, schizo-affective disorders and
migraine headaches." Id. at 593 n.8.
193 See id. at 595.
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matters. 194 Although the Court casually recognized the latter
interest, with little explanation, 195 it declined to find privacy
violations on either theory. 196 The Court considered a number of
factors which weighed in favor of New York, including the
statute's prohibition of public disclosure of the identities of any
of the patients, 197 and "the State's vital interest in controlling the
198
distribution of dangerous drugs."
The Whalen opinion is frequently credited with fashioning a
balancing test in which the state's interest in the disputed
legislation is weighed against the individual's privacy interest, 199
but this test, in fact, was formally articulated after Whalen, in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 20 0 In Nixon, the
Supreme Court confirmed Whalen's recognition of the privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 20 1 The Court,
however, did not go so far as to hold that former President
Richard Nixon's privacy rights were impermissibly violated by a
federal requirement that he submit various materials pertaining
to his presidency to national archivists, even though some of
those materials were records of personal conversations and

194 See id. at 599-600. The challengers argued that both interests were
"impaired by [the] statute" because "[t]he mere existence in readily available form of
the information about patients' use of [the particular] drugs create[d] a genuine
concern that the information [would] become publicly known and that it [would]
adversely affect their reputations." Id. at 600. They further claimed that this
concern would deter patients from using these drugs, and discourage doctors from
prescribing them. See id. Accordingly, the threat of improper disclosure implicated
the right of privacy in personal information, while the Act's deterrent aspects
affected "the making of decisions about matters vital to the care of their health." Id.
195 See id. at 599. Curiously, the Court's only cited authority for the privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters was the work of Professor
Kurland. See id. at 600 n.24. Professor Philip B. Kurland was a "constitutional
scholar," who was a consultant to the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of
Watergate. He taught law for 43 years at the University of Chicago, and died of
pneumonia on April 6, 1996 after undergoing treatment for heart problems. See
David Binder, Philip B. Kurland, 74, Scholar Who Ruled on Nixon Tapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, (Obituaries), at B9.
196 See id. at 600-06.
197 See id. at 594-95.
198 Id. at 598.
199 See Lagitch, supra note 14, at 111 n.55.
200 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
201 As the Court stated, "[olne element of privacy has been characterized as 'the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters .... ' " Id. at 457
(quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
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dealings.20 2 In reaching its decision, the Nixon Court explained
that "the claim must be considered in light of the specific
provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be weighed against
the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of
appellant's administration to archival screening."203
Whalen and Nixon appear to represent the whole of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the so-called right of privacy in
personal information. 20 4
Lower federal courts, however,
including several Circuit Courts of Appeals, have had occasion to
visit similar issues, and have routinely applied a balancing
analysis modeled on the Whalen-Nixon test.205 The Third Circuit
202 The Court explained that the privacy claim in Nixon was in fact weaker
than that asserted in Whalen, because, "unlike Whalen, the Government will not
even retain long-term control over such private information." Nixon, 433 U.S. at
458-59.
203 Id. at 458 (citation omitted).
204 Even in the most recent decisions, these opinions are routinely cited in
tandem as the origin of the right of privacy in nondisclosure of personal matters,
and as the only Supreme Court rulings on the right. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d
673, 683-84 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the evolution of the constitutional right to
privacy rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment); Kutler v. Carlin, 139 F.3d 237, 23839 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying the analysis set out by Nixon); Doe v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that the
Supreme Court in Whalen gave individuals a limited right of privacy in their
medical records); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
both Whalen and Nixon, when read out of context, lend credence to the plaintiffs
argument that he has a constitutional right to privacy); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d
836, 839-45 (1st Cir. 1987) (relying on Whalen and Nixon, the court held that the
information contained in the plaintiffs psychiatric file was not protected by the
confidentiality branch of the constitutional right of privacy, reversing a previous
court ruling); Williams v. Price, 25 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627-28 (W.D. Pa. 1998)
(discussing both Nixon and Whalen as a basis for the court's decision that the
plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to private communications with his
attorney); Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health, 710 So.2d 891, 892 (Ala. 1998)
(discussing the right of privacy implicated by a disclosure of one's medical records
based on Whalen).
205 See SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138-41 (explaining that the right to privacy should
be weighed against the state's interests and articulating key factors to be assessed
prior to performing the balancing test); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v.
City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that disclosure of
personal matters was required by applicants to the Philadelphia police department's
special investigation unit, after assessing that the interests of the government
outweighed the privacy interest of the applicants); Barry v. City of New York, 712
F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (clarifying that a balancing test approach is "in
keeping both with the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize new fundamental
interests requiring a high degree of scrutiny for alleged [privacy] infringements, and
the Court's recognition that some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is
necessary to safeguard the confidentiality interest"); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1980) (formulating factors to be
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case of United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation20 6 has
enjoyed a special prominence in the development of the law in
this area.20 7 In that case, the court examined the privacy
implications of a workplace safety investigation undertaken by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
("NIOSH") of a Westinghouse plant in Pennsylvania. 20 8 The
investigation required that Westinghouse turn over the medical
records of a number of present and past employees who had
worked in the plant.20 9 Westinghouse refused to relinquish these
records. 210 In determining that the NIOSH investigation was
justified and did not constitute an impermissible privacy
violation, 211 Judge Sloviter recognized the existence of a
constitutionally protected right of privacy in one's medical

considered in weighing the interests); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that the privacy right in non-disclosure of medical records is
not absolute, and discussing in detail the balancing test as described by the court in
Westinghouse); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Wisc. 1988) (noting
that many federal courts have misconstrued Whalen to find that a right to privacy
does exist, and courts have used the balancing test to define the extent to which
such a right exists. But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981)
(criticizing the widespread use of the balancing test by holding "that not all
rights.., of private information are of constitutional dimension, so as to require
balancing government action against individual privacy").
206 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
207 Westinghouse is discussed or emulated in a considerable proportion of
federal cases contemplating AIDS/HIV disclosure. See SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1139-40
(enumerating the seven factors that should be fully assessed before deciding
whether the method used by an employer to monitor an employee's prescription
coverage was an invasion of privacy); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Westinghouse court held the right to confidentiality
included "the right to protection regarding information about the state of one's
health"); Faison, 823 F. Supp. at 1205 (holding that disclosure of plaintiffs HIV
status in a pre-sentencing report did not violate her constitutional right to privacy
because the Westinghouse factors balanced in favor of such disclosure); Doe v.
Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that in light of
the Westinghouse factors, "the Constitution protects plaintiffs from governmental
disclosure of. . . infection with the AIDS virus"); Woods, 689 F. Supp. at 876
(explaining that since defendant did not assert a claim of important public interest,
there was no need to apply the Westinghouse balancing test).
208 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 572-73.
209 See id. NIOSIs concern was that these employees may have been exposed
to toxic substances in certain areas of the plant. See id. at 572. The records
requested included reports of physical examinations given to employees at the time
they were hired, encompassing x-rays as well as the results of hearing, sight, and
blood tests. See id. at 572 n.1.
210
211

See id. at 573.

See id. at 578-79.
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records, 212 and carefully examined the balancing formula
attributed to Whalen and Nixon.213 Sloviter identified several
factors that should be considered in weighing the competing
interests of the state and the individual. 214 These factors are: (1)
the type of record requested by the government; (2) the
information it contains or might contain; (3) "the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure"; (4) the
injury which disclosure may cause to "the relationship in which
the record was generated"; (5) the adequacy of measures in place
to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the need for the
government's access to the information; and (7) "whether there is
an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognizable public interest militating toward access." 215 The
Westinghouse factors have been given substantial deference by a
216
multitude of courts.
C. The Right of Privacyand AIDS/HIV Disclosure
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on any issue
pertaining to AIDS/HIV status disclosure. 217 A number of lower
courts, however, have examined AIDS/HIV disclosure in one
context or another. Although no federal court appears to have
ruled on the constitutionality of an AIDS/HIV partner
212

See id. at 577.

There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may
contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy protection. Information about one's body and state
of health is [a] matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain
within the 'private enclave where he may lead a private life.'
Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
213 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577-78.
214
215
216
217

See id. at 578.

Id.
See supranote 207.
Circuit Courts of Appeals analyzing the issue find Supreme Court precedent

only in Whalen, which dealt with medical records, and not specifically AIDS or HIV
status. See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133,
1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the right to privacy according to Whalen fell into
two categories; "an individual's interest in independence in making certain
decisions, [and] ... an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information"); Doe

v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (articulating the distinction
made by Whalen between the right to confidentiality in regards to personal
information and the right to autonomy and independence in decision-making,
ultimately holding that under Whalen the plaintiff had a constitutional right to
confidentiality in his HIV status).
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notification law, 2 18 the cases approach unanimity on the question
of whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of one's AIDS/HIV status-so far
as these courts are concerned, the right exists.2 19 The majority of
cases dealing with such disclosure conduct their analyses in the
Whalen-Nixon framework, weighing the state action of disclosure
against the infected individual's privacy interest in maintaining
confidentiality. 220
A number of these cases qualify their
218 The majority of cases in the federal court system have dealt with the
constitutionality of prisoners or individuals in police custody. See Faison v. Parker,
823 F. Supp. 1198, 1207 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff, an inmate at a
State correctional facility, was not denied a constitutional right when her AIDS
status was disclosed in a pre-sentencing report); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F.
Supp. 715, 731 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that prison inmates are protected by a
constitutional right of privacy regarding their HIV status and that "convicted
prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections") (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 545 (1979)); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876-77 (W.D. Wisc. 1988)
(holding that an incarcerated plaintiff retained the right to privacy over his AIDS
status, regardless of his status as a convicted felon). But see Middlebrooks v. State
Bd. of Health, 710 So. 2d 891, 892-893 (Ala. 1998) (concluding, in dicta, that an
Alabama notification law was not in violation of a plaintiffs right to privacy);
Lampart v. State of Connecticut, No. 95-322-668, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2976, at
*1, *6 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1995) (specifying the information a public
health officer must relay to the partner of an individual who is either known to be or
might be infected with lIV or AIDS); Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. v. Garcia, 964
S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that a Texas notification law which
required the results of an HIV test to be released to a spouse "if the person tests
positive for AIDS and HIV infection, antibodies to HIV, or infection with any other
probable causative agent of AIDS," did not come into effect until after the plaintiffs
spouse tested positive for AIDS).
219 See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Individuals
who are infected with the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to privacy
regarding their condition."); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1991)
("[Tihere are few decisions over which a person could have a greater desire to
exercise control, than the manner in which he reveals [an HIVI diagnosis to
others."); Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Mass. 1993) ("[Tlhis
court finds that plaintiff has a constitutional right to privacy which encompasses
nondisclosure of her HIV status."); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985
(N.D. Ohio 1991) ("While not all information would be protected by the constitution
from disclosure, this Court believes that information relating to AIDS... is of a
fundamental enough nature to be protected.); Nolley, 776 F. Supp. at 730 ("We
nevertheless believe and assume.., that.. .[HIV-positive] prisoners enjoy some
significant constitutionally-protected privacy interest in preventing the nonconsensual disclosure of their HIV-positive diagnoses .... ."); Doe v. Borough of
Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) ("This court finds that the
Constitution protects plaintiffs from governmental disclosure of their... infection
with the AIDS virus.").
220 See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994)
(explaining that further fact determination was required in order to weigh state
versus individual interests); Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (D.
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balancing tests with some variation on the Westinghouse
factors. 221 Proceeding from this analysis, several courts have
found impermissible violations of the right in question.
Among them is the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, in Doe v. Borough of Barrington.222 In
Barrington,"Mr. Doe" was arrested after being pulled over in a
routine vehicle stop.2 2 At the time of the arrest, Doe warned the
police officers that he was HIV-positive, and that they should be
2
careful in searching him, because he had "weeping lesions." 2
One of the arresting officers later revealed Mr. Doe's identity
and HIV-positive status to an acquaintance of the Doe family. 2 m
This acquaintance, whose children attended school with the Doe
children, became alarmed, and contacted other parents with
children in this common school, as well as members of the news
media. 226 By the next day, eleven parents had removed nineteen
children from the school, 227 presumably fearing HIV infection.
The Does claimed that they were thereafter "shunned by the
community" and brought an action for invasion of privacy,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.22
Citing Whalen and Westinghouse, the court recognized the
existence of a constitutional right protecting the Doe family from
the disclosure of Mr. Doe's condition, 229 explaining that "[tihe

Mass. 1993) (asserting that the circumstances surrounding disclosure are key to
balancing the state's interest in disclosure against the plaintiffs right to
confidentiality); Faison, 823 F. Supp. at 1201-02 (stating that the disclosure of

plaintiffs HIV status in her pre-sentence report outweighed her privacy interests,
and that this information was necessary for her children to receive adequate
services once she was incarcerated).

221 See, e.g., SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140; Faison, 823 F. Supp. at 1201; see also
supra note 207 and accompanying text.
222 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
22 See id. at 378.

=1 Id.

=' See id. at 378-79.
= See id. at 379.
=7

See id.

Id. Doe had died shortly after the suit was filed. See id. at 379 n.3. The
court, however, permitted the Doe family to proceed with this action because the
"hysteria surrounding AIDS extends beyond those who have the disease. The stigma
attaches not only to the AIDS victim, but to those in contact with AIDS
patients... " Id. at 384 (citation omitted). Hence, the court concluded, "[tihose
sharing a household with an infected person suffer from disclosure just as the victim
does. Family members, therefore, have a substantial interest in keeping this
information confidential." Id. at 385.
See id. at 382.
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sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS makes a
compelling
argument
for
keeping
this
information
confidential."230 The court noted, however, that "[an individual's
privacy interest in medical information and records is not
absolute,"231 and proceeded to weigh the societal interest in
disclosure against the privacy interest of the Doe family. 232 The
disclosing police officer had apparently revealed Mr. Doe's
condition for the purpose of warning the family's acquaintance
and safeguarding her from contracting the disease. 233 The court
found that even though this objective represented an appropriate
state aim,234 it was not served by the officer's disclosure, as it

was commonly understood even at the time of the incident in
question that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact. 5s
Accordingly, the court held that the state had not advanced a
"compelling interest," for the disclosure and it amounted to a
violation of privacy rights.2 6
The Northern District of Ohio reached a similar conclusion
in Doe v. City of Cleveland.2 7 In that case, another "Doe" was
arrested for stabbing a friend. The arresting officers, on the
basis of a tip, came to suspect that Doe had AIDS.2 8 Doe was
230 Id. at 384.
231 Id. at 385.
232 See id.
233 See id. The police officer warned the acquaintance, who had just had contact

with Mrs. Doe, that Mr. Doe had AIDS, and that the acquaintance should "wash
with disinfectant." Id.
' See id. ("While prevention of this deadly disease is clearly an appropriate
state objective, this objective was not served by [the officer's] statement that [the
acquaintance] should wash with disinfectant.").
2M5 See id.
2M Id.

237 788 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
m9 See id. at 981. The tip had come from Doe's stabbing victim. See id. In fact,
Doe did not have AIDS. See id. The Cleveland Police Department had rules

regarding the disclosure of arrestees' private information, that stated such
information should be treated as confidential and should not be released to third
parties absent an arrestee's consent. See id. There was an exception, however, for
the arrest of" 'persons suspected of, or found to be suffering from ... AIDS.' "Id. at
982 (citation omitted). Thus, although Doe was only suspected of having AIDS and
there was no verification (by a laboratory test) of his condition, some disclosure was
allowed. The police department's order only allowed for disclosure to be made to the
City Health Department, any other agency that received custody of the arrestee or
any prosecutor or judge assigned to the case. See id. The court did not find these
rules unconstitutional on their face. See id at 986. Thus, although the police officer
may have applied the statute in an unconstitutional manner, Doe couldn't succeed
on a § 1983 claim against the city because it required a showing that "the
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An
not charged with any crime, and was released.2 9
unidentified police officer, however, forwarded a note to Doe's
place of work 24°-a McDonald's restaurant-stating that Doe had
AIDS.24 1 Doe was confronted with this note by his employers,
and fired because he was suspected of having the disease.2 4 Doe
filed suit claiming that the publication to McDonald's of the
allegation that he was suspected of having AIDS, deprived him
243
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and privacy.
Once again, a balancing test between the government's interest
in disclosure and the individual's need for privacy was
contemplated,2 4 with the court concluding that because "there
was no legitimate governmental interest to be served by
disclosure of the information to McDonald's," 2 45 the conduct itself
impermissibly transgressed Doe's privacy interest. 246 The court,
however, declined to hold the City of Cleveland liable for the
wrongful conduct of its police officers. 247
In contrast to the decisions discussed above, which found
AIDS/IV disclosure to violate an individual's right to privacy,
there is federal authority upholding instances of AIDS/HIV
disclosure as legitimate and permissible. Prison HIV policies
248
were at issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Harrisv. Thigpen.
In Harris, an Alabama law required that all state and local
constitutional deprivation was the result of the implementation of an
unconstitutional city policy." Id. (emphasis added). The only other theory upon

which the city could be held liable for a section 1983 violation was if it "failed to
properly train the officers and such failure 'reflects the deliberate indifference to the
constitutional right of its inhabitants.' " See id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989)). Doe didn't have sufficient evidence to succeed on this theory.
See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
29 See Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
240 The note read: "Even though AIDS cannot be transmitted by contact it is
unfortunate that [Doe] is associated with McDonald's. I feel the person in charge
should know in case it can help you in any way. Please; [sic] and I trust you will
keep this information confidential." Id. (alteration in original).
241 See id.
242 See id.
2M3See id. at 983.
24 See id. at 985.
245 Id.
m See id.
247 The court found that the police conduct was not the product of any deficient

policies or training schemes utilized by Cleveland, but rather "the result of one
officer's malicious circumvention of Cleveland's policy." Id. at 986; see also supra
note 238.
218 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
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prison inmates be tested for AIDS/HIV and other infections
diseases, 249 and those testing positive for AIDS or HIV were
assigned to segregated HIV wards. 50 The court found that the
segregation policy was "a reasonable infringement in light of the
inmate interests at stake... and the difficult decisions that the
[correctional authority] must make in determining how best to
treat and control.., the spread of a communicable, incurable,
always fatal disease."25' Thus, although the court recognized
that the segregation involved "a measure of non-consensual
disclosure of an inmate's seropositive status,"25 2 the balancing
25 4
analysis 253 required that the policy be upheld.
Outside of the prison context, the Third Circuit examined
AIDS/HIV disclosure in Doe v. SEPTA. 5 5 In SEPTA, a public

employee alleged violations of his privacy rights stemming from
the discovery of his HI V-positive status from a workplace
prescription drug program and subsequent disclosures of his
status to several of his managers. 5 6 Notwithstanding the
disclosures to Doe's managers, the court concentrated its
analysis on the prescription plan itself, which is, by its structure,
what enabled the employers to discover Doe's condition.
Applying the Westinghouse factors, the court balanced the
competing interests 257 to hold that the public employer's "need
for access to employee prescription records... when the
information disclosed is only for the purpose of monitoring the
29 See id. at 1499 n.2.
250 See id. at 1500.
251 Id. at 1521.
252 Id. at 1514.
2
See id. at 1515 (noting that it must "balance the limited personal privacy
interests.., of the seropositive inmates, with those legitimate interests that
underlie the.., decision to segregate such inmates from the general prison
population").
254 See id. at 1521. In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Harris,a
pair of notable district court cases found certain prison disclosure policies to violate
the privacy rights of inmates. See Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 733
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding prison's policy of placing red stickers on an inmate's
documents and personal items, to indicate HIV-positive status, violated the inmate's
constitutional right to privacy because it was "not reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests"); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1236-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that mandatory relocation to an HIV-positive dormitory violated prisoners'
right to privacy due to the substantial risk that the inmates diagnosis would be
revealed to family members and friends); see also supra note 219.
255 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
256 See id. at 1135-37.
257 See id. at 1139-43.
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plans by those with a need to know, outweighs an employee's
interest in keeping his prescription drug purchases
8
confidential."2
V. NEW YORK'S TITLE Ill AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Applying the dominant analysis for issues pertaining to the
right of privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal information, it
is necessary to identify and weigh the individual's privacy
interest in nondisclosure of his HIV-positive status against New
York State's interest in enacting Title III.
Given their
widespread esteem, the Westinghouse factors will inform the
balancing analysis undertaken here.
A. The Individual'sPrivacyInterest in Avoiding Disclosureof
AIDS IHIV Status.
Since its appearance on the radar screen of the American
consciousness in the early 1980s, 9 AIDS has been met with
widespread fear and loathing by the public. 260 Contributing to

the anxiety, no doubt, is the infectious, incurable, and fatal
nature of the disease.261 Many people, of course, simply fear
transmission. AIDS, however, unlike other deadly diseases, has
also come to be associated with certain "deviant" or "immoral"
behaviors. 262 Very early in the course of popular exposure to the
disease, public perception segregated those infected into
"innocent" and "guilty" camps.263 The "innocent" included
hemophiliacs receiving tainted blood transfusions, female

Id. at 1143.
See Jeffrey Weeks, Love in a Cold Climate, in SOCIAL ASPECTS OF AIDS 10,
11 (Peter Aggleton & Hilary Homans eds., 1988) (reporting that the AIDS virus was
first encountered in the United States in 1981).
=6 See id. at 11-12. According to Weeks, the acute "moral panic" and anxiety
surrounding AIDS is attributable to a genuine fear of the disease, as well as its
associations with a number of generally disfavored social phenomena, including the
erosion of the American family unit and the inversion of sexual mores. Id. at 12.
261 One writer has suggested that because AIDS is incurable, lethal and "lodges
itself within the very cells on which we rely for protection against the invasion of
germs," AIDS maintains a unique posture in tormenting the public, and that
"AIDS... resulting from the HIV infection, is the ultimate symbol of our
vulnerability." ANGELA MOLNOS, OUR RESPONSES TO A DEADLY VIRUS: THE GROUP2Z

29

ANALYTIC APPROACH 10 (1990).
262 Weeks, supra note 259, at 12

(noting that "[tihere is a typical stereotyping of
the main actors as peculiar types of monsters").
263

Id.
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partners of bisexual men, and children born to infected
mothers. 26 The "guilty" included a much larger proportion of
those stricken: drug addicts, so-called "promiscuous"
heterosexuals, and homosexual men. 265

Contributing to this

phenomenon were serious distortions by the news media which,
according to some commentators, accentuated the connections
between AIDS and such controversial behaviors as recreational
drug use and homosexual activity, in order to cultivate
sensationalistic reporting.266 The result was the attachment of a
devastating stigma to a devastating illness.
Discrimination against persons with AIDS has become a
serious concern. It is common for infected individuals to be
denied medical treatment, employment, or service by any
number of public accommodations. 267 Recently, the Supreme
Court held that people with HIV are protected as "disabled"
within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 268 an Act designed "for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."269 Persons with AIDS or
HIV are undoubtedly in need of such protection. Many people,
even now, remain ignorant of how HIV is spread, with some still
fearing transmission by casual contact. 270 Such fears have led to
numerous incidents of workplace discrimination, prompting suits
by those alleging to have been dismissed on the basis of being
infected. 271 Moreover, persons whose HIV/AIDS status has been
264

Id.

2m5Id.

266 See Kaye Wellings, Perceptions of Risk-Media Treatment of AIDS, in
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF AIDS 83 (Peter Aggleton & Hilary Homans, eds., 1988).
267 See Gostin & Hodge, Names Debate, supra note 11, at 724.
26 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998) (determining that an
HIV infection constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
since it is a physical impairment that hinders a person's "major life activitfies]"); see
also American With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining
"disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
269 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
270 See POWELL, supra note 18, at 82 (noting one doctor's disbelief at the
public's lack of knowledge regarding HIV transmission); Wellings, supra note 266,
at 90-93 (discussing various early AIDS causation theories).
271 See Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding, in an employment discrimination case, that asymptomatic HIV was

not a disability within the meaning of the ADA), overruled by Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998); Monroe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 97-C-506, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4169, *14 (N.D. ll. Apr. 1, 1998) (denying summary judgement to an
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revealed to a large circle of peers sometimes report, in lieu of
aggressive discrimination, a subtle sense of alienation, as those
with whom they were once close withdraw for fear of contracting
27 2
the disease.
The interest in avoiding disclosure is even greater for those
persons who also happen to be members of particular
subpopulations. AIDS has taken a disproportionate toll on
African Americans and Hispanics, 273 not to mention homosexual
men, who are perhaps the most over-represented.2 7 4 Such
groups are subject to an indeterminate degree of discrimination
even absent HIV infection, and the addition of AIDS to the
275
equation has a tendency to exacerbate their difficulties.

AIDS-infected.employee who claimed that he was discriminated against based on
his condition); Huck v. Mega Nursing Servs., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1462, 1465 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (dismissing discharged HIV-positive employee's suit); Hernandez v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (denying
summary judgment against an HIV infected employee claiming discrimination
because of his condition). Similarly, patrons of establishments have been excluded
from such due to their HIV status. See 12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star
Indemnity Co., 93 F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1996).
272 See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133,
1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting plaintiffs allegation that after disclosure of his HIVpositive status in the office, his co-workers socialized with him less frequently, they
rarely ate the baked goods he brought to the office, and the office seemed lonelier
than it had before); Nancy Rivera Brooks, Work Force Diversity; Fond Fairwells;
Companies and Colleagues areHelping the Seriously Ill Work and Die with Dignity,
LA. TMIES, May 16, 1994, at 11 (suggesting that managers should prevent "subtle
discrimination by co-workers such as coffee cups that are washed separately"); Gay
Pair"Try to be Good Role Models" -Couple Take [sic] Keen Interest in Gay Issues,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 15, 1992, at K10, available in 1992 WL 6525706 (noting that
many homosexual couples, with or without AIDS face "discrimination -often
subtle"); Julia Lawlor, HIV-Infected Workers Get Little Support, USA TODAY, Nov.
11, 1991, at 1B, available in 1991 WL 6768984 (discussing subtle forms of
discrimination in the workplace).
273 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 165. In 1993, 69% of those diagnosed with
HIV in New York City were either African-American or Hispanic. See id.
24 See MUMA, supra note 24, at 8 (noting that even though gay men no longer
represent the majority of AIDS cases in the United States, they still remain high on
the list, and as late as 1992, represented a staggering 57% of all cases in the U.S.);
see also POWELL, supra note 18, at 34-36 (discussing the gay male population and
the spread of AIDS); Cary Savitch, Public Health Needs Mandatory AIDS Testing;
How Many Lives Will Be Sacrificed at the Alter of Privacy?, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 12, 1998, at C15, available in 1998 WL 3319374 (reporting that
"57[%] of new AIDS cases in the U.S. are gay men").
275 See Weeks, supra note 259, at 11 (stating that AIDS has become "a
battlefield for conflicting moral and political values").
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Homosexuals in particular have experienced violent hate crimes
27 6
since the proliferation of AIDS.

Opponents of New York's Title III urge that the sense of fear
New York homosexuals experience with respect to homophobia
would be greatly augmented by the requirement that HIVpositive individuals' names be reported to the State. 277 Others
protest that this variety of "forced" partner notification will
devastate the personal relationships of those with the disease,
without sensitivity to the time and care needed to make such a
life-changing decision as that of informing a partner of this
serious news.27 8 Indeed, there is no question that divulging to a

spouse or a sexual partner that one has AIDS would put a

276 See POWELL, supra note 18, at 138-40 (providing specific examples of hate
crimes); Patrick Heck, Sexual Minorities; Include Gays in Hate Crime Protection,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 4, 1999, at B9, availablein 1999 WL 7163853 (noting a 1999
study documenting 58 anti-gay hate crimes in Virginia); Hugo Martin, Gays Form
Patrols to Battle Hate Crimes; Self-Defense: With Attacks on Homosexuals
Increasing, The West Hollywood Effort is Part of a Mobilization Throughout the
Southland, LA. TIMES, Dec. 3 1991, at B1, available in 1991 WL 2198647
(discussing the increase of anti-gay hate crimes by 42% in Los Angeles, New York
City, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston and Minneapolis-St. Paul in 1990). The degree
of violence directed at homosexuals was vividly rendered in the recent case of
Matthew Shepard, a gay Wyoming college student who was bound and beaten by
two attackers, and later died from his injuries. Mr. Shepard was not reported to
have either AIDS or HIV. See Allan Lengel, Thousands Mourn Student's Death;
Beating in Wyoming Sparks New Push for Hate-CrimesLaws, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
1998, at A7, available in 1998 WL 16562476 (discussing how Shepard's death
caused a rally for a hate-crimes bill); Wire Stories, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 15,
1998, at A2, available in 1998 WL 20387389 (explaining how Shepard's death led to
a reform campaign).
277 See Letter from Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legislative Counsel, New York's
Lesbian and Gay Political Advocacy Organization, to the Hon. Nettie Mayersohn,
New York State Assembly Member, Assembly Sponsor of Title III (May 1, 1998) (on
file with author) (arguing that the passage of Title III would preclude HIV infected
individuals from seeking treatment). Ms. Ettelbrick writes, "Gay men and lesbians,
who already feel their lives and interests are compromised by homophobia and
discrimination, would be particularly threatened by the prospect of having to openly
reveal that they are gay to a governmental authority." Id.
278 See The Empire State Pride Agenda, supra note 10, at 1 (contending that
Title III will cause HIV infected individuals to avoid care). "Before the patient has
time to deal with the diagnosis and the impact such a diagnosis will have on his life,
the health department will be allowed to knock on the door, phone, mail to or
otherwise contact their spouse and other sexual partners." Id. Furthermore, "[i]t is
difficult to escape the feeling that this bill deals with HIV infected patients not as
people with a serious disease and a number of life-changing choices that may take
time, but rather as criminals." Id.
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profound strain on the relationship, if not cause its outright
279
destruction.
Hence, the infected individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of his AIDS/HIV status to the State or to his sexual
partners resides in the threat of discrimination native to HIV
infection, and the potential loss of personal relations. Indeed, as
the Eleventh Circuit explained in Harris:
The threat to family life and... close ties with others... is
quite real when an AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed.
Ignorance and prejudice concerning the disease are widespread;
the decision of whether, or how, or when to risk familial and
communal opprobrium 280and even ostracism is one of
fundamental importance.
B. New York State's Interest in Enacting Title III
Currently there are between 650,000 and 900,000
Americans infected with HIV.281
The Centers for Disease
Control estimate that at least 43,000 people become infected
with HIV each year.2 2 In 1997, New York State led the United
States in the number of AIDS cases, with 113,549, edging out the
nation's other large AIDS locus, California, which had 101,569
cases.m
The incidence of AIDS infection is growing more rapidly
among women than any other group in the United States. 284 In
279 In one particularly illustrative and perhaps typical case, a young couple
called off their wedding when they discovered that the man was HIV-positive, but
the woman was not. See Jim Yardley, Breaking the H.I.V. Chain: CounselorsBattle
Spread of Infection-andDespair,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at 27.
280 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Doe v.
Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
2s8 See Carrie Donovan, AIDS Screening, WASH. POST, June 22, 1999, at Z20,
available in 1999 WL 17010114 (citing the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention); see also Erika Perrone Tatum, Note, The Impact of the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct on AIDS Discriminationin the Workplace, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
623, 623 (1996) (noting that as of 1990, approximately one million Americans - one
out of every 250 - were infected with HIV).
2
See Michele M. Contreras, Note, New York's Mandatory H1V Testing of
Newborns: A Positive Step Which Results in Negative Consequences for Women and
Their Children, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 21, 22 (1998) (discussing New York's socalled "AIDS Baby Bill").
2=3 See Albert, supra note 15, at 1024 n.54 (providing a statistical analysis of
AIDS cases throughout the United States).
' See Contreras, supra note 282, at 21 (citing Eileen M. McKenna, Note, The
Mandatory Testing of Newborns for HIV: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late, 13 N.Y.L.
SCI-L J. HUM RTS. 307, 317 (1997)).
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1993, AIDS and AIDS-related ailments were the fourth leading
2
cause of death among women between the ages of 25 and 44. 8
That same year, AIDS was the "leading cause[] of death among
6
women in fifteen of the 135 largest cities in the United States."2
As of 1993, at least 25,000 women in New York were infected
with HIV, and the percentage of new female AIDS cases due to
heterosexual transmission, as opposed to needle-sharing
transmission, rose to 30.7%.287 Approximately "eighty five
percent of women with AIDS are of childbearing age."2
Consequently, the CDC estimated that in 1992, the seventh
leading cause of death for children between the ages of one and
four was AIDS, transmitted perinatally from infected mothers. 289
New York State itself accounts for one quarter of the nation's
pediatric AIDS/HIV cases, 290 87% of which are attributable to
New York City alone. 291 Furthermore, estimates indicate that
up to 50,000 children will be orphaned in New York City by the
loss of their mothers to AIDS over the next several years. 292 This
is probably the largest orphaning of children ever to occur in a
293
single American city.

Many people at risk of contracting HIV from their partners
have no idea they are in danger, and many infected individuals
find it difficult to tell partners on their own.2 94 A recent study of

HIV-positive persons found that approximately 66% of its
participants remained sexually active after infection, and about
40% did not disclose their HIV-positive status to all of their
2
See Contreras, supra note 282, at 21 (citing Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS is
Now the Leading Killer of Americans from 25 to 44, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at
C7).
2
Contreras, supra note 282, at 21.
287 See Nina Bernstein, When Women Aren't Told Their Lovers are Dying of

AIDS, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1993, at 52, available in

1993 WL 11351755

(contending that many women in New York are not aware of the great risk of
contracting AIDS).
2a Contreras, supra note 282, at 21 (citing McKenna, supra note 284, at 318).
289 See Contreras, supra note 282, at 21 (footnote omitted).
290 See id. at 21-22.
291 See id. at 22.
292 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 166. Other estimates place the number of
children to be orphaned in New York City over the next five years at 30,000. See
David J. Lansner, Recent Legislation in Child Welfare, 1988-97, in CHILD ABUSE,
NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 1998; EFFECTIVE SOCIAL WORK AND THE

LEGAL SYSTEM; THE ATTORNEY'S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 507, 576 (1998).
293 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 166.
294 See Bernstein, supra note 287, at 52 (expressing that these are "two hard
truths about a decade's worth of efforts to halt the epidemic").
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sexual partners.295 Moreover, two-thirds of these individuals
reported that they did not always use condoms. 296 Strangely,

according to the study, infected individuals seem least likely to
inform their spouses or other long term partners.297
Not
surprisingly, the reasons for such apprehension include a fear of
rejection by the partner, shame, and anxiety about the stigma
attached to AIDS.298 A similar study by the CDC found that 70%
of partners were not informed by those testing HIV-positive. 2 99
New York is no exception to these disturbing patterns. In
1993, there were approximately 18,000 positive HIV tests in
New York City.300 That same year, there were only 350 partner

notifications via the City's voluntary Department of Health
partner notification program.3 0 1 In 1991, of 25,896 people who
voluntarily sought HIV testing in New York, only 933 reported
that they had been cautioned to do so by their partner.3 0 2 In fact,
New York has seen the least partner notification of any major
AIDS location in the United States, and possibly the least
notification per infected individual as well.30 3 It is important to
bear in mind here that these poor results have been harvested
04
notwithstanding New York's previous notification by petition
and direct physician notification provisions.3 05 In particular,
295 See Michael Woods, HIV-positive Still Having Sex: Study, SOUTH BEND
TRIB., Feb. 9, 1998, at a3.
290 See Brenda Coleman, Study Finds Many People with AIDS Virus Don't Tell
Sex Partners,Feb. 9, 1998 (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.onlineathens.com/
1998/020998/0209.a3sex.html>.
2w See Woods, supra note 295, at a3.
298 See id.
2
See Bernstein, supra note 287, at 52. Yet another study by the University of
North Carolina found that as few as 7% of sex partners were informed by infected
individuals. See id.
30oSee Norwood, supra note 16, at 161.
301 See id. According to the New York State Health Department, there were
approximately 12,000-15,000 HIV-positive tests in New York in 1996, and less than
400 partner notifications. See Legislative Memorandum from the League of Women
Voters of New York State in Support of A. 6629 - A / S. 4422 - A to the Members of
the Assembly (June 16, 1998) (on file with author).
302 See Bernstein, supra note 287, at 52. The article does not specify whether
the partner was infected.
303 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 164.
304 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2785(2) (McKinney 1993). "A court may grant
an order for disclosure of confidential HIV related information upon an application
showing [certain needs and public safety concerns]." Id.
305 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4) (McKinney 1993). "A physician may
disclose confidential HIV related information [so long as four statutory conditions
are met]." Id..
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New York's permissive direct notification provision is limited,
allowing doctors to notify partners of infected individuals only
when they believe the contact is at a significant risk of exposure
to the disease, and that the patient himself will not inform the
partner. 30 6 In New York's crowded and overworked hospitals, it
is nearly impossible for physicians to take the time or make the
personal investment necessary to determine that an infected
patient is unlikely to inform his partner.30 7 Hence, New York's
approach to partner notification thus far, relying on petition and
permissive methods, has been largely 'neffective in controlling
the spread of AIDS.308
This is especially dispiriting if one understands the potential
in an effective partner notification program. It is imperative to
notify at-risk partners early, particularly women, because HIV is
not easily transmitted through heterosexual intercourse in the
first few years after a man has been infected.3 0 9 The virus
becomes increasingly transmissible, however, as his immune
system begins to deteriorate.3 10 Typically, this pattern yields a
period of five years or more, in which it is possible to save the
majority of partners from infection.3 1 1 Furthermore, even for
those partners who have been infected, early notification will
prolong and possibly save lives, as the most recent drug
treatments are most effective when begun early in HIV
development. 3 12 In spite of these invaluable opportunities, it
appears that the pre-Title III system in New York continually
fails, and healthy people are being infected with HIV by

306 See id. at § 2782(4)(a)(2)-(3); Norwood, supra note 16, at 164.
307 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 164-65.
308 See Bernstein, supra note 287, at 52 (suggesting that New York lacks the

political will to emphasize partner-notification strategies). In 1993, CDC partner
notification authority Dr. Kathleen Toomey expressed that New York's approach
was underdeveloped. See id. Furthermore, in its entire first year, New York's law
permitting doctors to refer partner notification duties to the state was not utilized
even once. See id.
309 See Norwood, supra note 16, at 166.
310 See id.
311 See id.
312 See Avram

Goldstein, Williams Considers Listing HIV Names; Opponents
Prefer Databaseof Numbers, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1999, at B1, available in 1999
WL 23298410 (noting effectiveness of lifesaving 1IV drugs depends on starting
therapy early"); Denise Mann, HIV Going Undiagnosed in Some Women, Study
Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 1998, at C3, available in 1998 WL

13096660 (noting "cocktails... are most effective when they are started early").
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knowingly-infected persons whom they love and trust.3 13 The
state of the crisis is best captured in the words of one
commentator: "It is unprecedented in modem health history to
know so absolutely that literally thousands of people are at risk
of a fatal disease and not take ordinary public health measures
which can significantly slow its spread."3 1 4
C. Balancingthe Interests
One of the key Westinghouse factors to be considered in a
balancing analysis such as this is whether "there is an express
statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognizable public interest militating toward access" to the
information in question.3 15 It is submitted that the serious AIDS
problem in New York constitutes a "recognizable public interest
militating toward access." The policy concerns driving Title III
are abundant and clear-lives are in danger, but may be saved.
New York has been devastated by AIDS more than any other
state. If mandatory names reporting is justifiable anywhere, it
is in New York. Accordingly, the "degree of need for access,"
another Westinghouse factor,3 16 is also great.
Another crucial Westinghouse consideration is "the adequacy
of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure." 317 Title III
expressly prohibits the disclosure of the HIV-related information
to any party other than the health authorities, the infected
individual himself, and the endangered contact. 318 Moreover,
Title III does not permit the disclosure of the infected
individual's identity to the notified contact.3 19 In Whalen, the
313 Newspaper articles throughout the 1990s are laden with heart-breaking
accounts. Such is the case of Barbara Williams of Brooklyn, a mother of five, who
has AIDS. Williams contracted the disease from her boyfriend of three years, who
knew he was infected. Williams had unprotected sex with her boyfriend throughout
the relationship, but explained that she would have insisted on the use of a condom
had she known of his condition. Ironically, Williams was a frequent attendee of
AIDS prevention meetings, and was well aware of the means of transmission. This
only lends greater support to her claim that she would have exercised caution, had
she any reason to suspect there was a danger. See Shelley Pannill, HIV Bill Would
Change Rules of Confidentiality, BRONX BEAT, Apr. 28, 1997, at 1; see also Peyser,

supranote 2, at 5.
314 Norwood, supra note 16, at 165-66.
315 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
16 Id.
317

Id.

318 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2134 (McKinney Supp. 1999).

319 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2133(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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Supreme Court upheld New York's drug prescription reporting
law which, like Title III, involved the Department of Health's
collection and administration of the information in question.
The Court was impressed by the Act's prohibition of
unwarranted disclosures, 320 and the majority explained that
"New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing
administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and
protection of, the individual's interest in privacy."3 21
Whereas "the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure"3 22 of an individual's HIV-positive
status is substantial, this factor cannot overcome the
considerable need for an aggressive partner notification law in
New York. Title III simply appears to be necessary. Indeed, it
appears that the band has played on quite long enough in New
York.323 There is no doubt that, with this law, the community
ventures into disturbing territory. It is a legislative maneuver
which is necessarily accompanied by trepidation and remorse,
and it is not to be celebrated by any particular political wing. In
a transaction in which we may save lives only at the cost of
making more terrifying the ordeal of those who wrestle every
day with a disease most of us would rather not think about, we
are not faced with an option to choose an unequivocal "good."
Hence, New York's new partner notification law, although
necessary, represents the lesser of two evils.
CONCLUSION

Title III of Article 27 of the New York Public Health Law is
sustainable under a constitutional right of privacy analysis.
Although the individual's interest in nondisclosure of his HIVpositive status is substantial, it is outweighed by New York's
profound interest implementing new measures to slow the
spread of a devastating disease.
Benjamin F. Neidl

320

See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594, 605 (1977).

321

Id. at 605.

32 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
323 See generally RANDY SHMiTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON

the early spread of the AIDS epidemic in the U.S.).

(1987) (chronicling

